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ABSTRACT 
The major concern in a mergers and acquisitions (M&A) transaction is how to 
determine the economic benefits and burdens and allocate them among the participating 
firms. Part of this concern can be described as the question of how the participating firms 
ascertain and price the potential tax benefits of the target's tax attributes. 
Different from prior research, which focuses on the reaction of the market, this 
study emphasizes the viewpoint of the participating firms in pricing the target firms' 
deferred taxes when determining the acquisition price. The results indicate that the 
participating firms assign value to the target firms' deferred taxes. Further decomposing 
the deferred taxes into several components shows that net deferred tax assets are given 
value regardless of the taxability of acquisitions. However, deferred tax liabilities are 
assigned negative value in taxable transactions but are ignored in non-taxable 
transactions. Also, deferred tax assets from all others (AODTA) are priced by the 
participating firms, but deferred tax assets from other loss carryforwards (OLC) and tax 
credit carryforwards (TCC) are not. Moreover, deferred tax assets from NOL 
carryforwards (NOL) are priced only when the ratio of target's book value of equity to 
market value of equity is high. This finding is different from prior research which 
suggests NOL carryforwards and tax credit carryforwards are priced by the market. This 
difference implies that the market and the participating firms have a different point of 
view on the value of deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards. 
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Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) have been a popular business activity over the 
past decades.1 The number of U.S. M&A per year has increased from less than 1,000 
before the 1950s to more than 10,000 in the late 1990s (Bruner, 2004). Although M&A 
activity slowed down after the Internet bubble burst in 2000, the volume and value of 
M&A has increased during the past four years. The U.S. M&A market is anticipating a 
rise somewhere between 15% and 20% in 2007, which may push M&A activity to a new 
record high (Cohen, 2007). 
Looking at aggregate M&A activity over the past 100 years, Bruner (2004) 
identifies five merger "waves" during which the merger activity was heightened. Bruner 
(2004) indicates several reasons, such as managerial hubris, market mania, market 
overvaluation, information asymmetry, agency costs, and industry shocks, to explain 
these waves. Further, he suggests that potential and actual M&A activity occurs in 
industry and company settings where economic turbulence is particularly active. 
1
 Bruner (2004, p. 12) refers to the Oxford English Dictionary and defines "merger" as "the consolidation 
or combination of one firm or trading company with another." Further, "acquisition" is simply defined as 
"a purchase." This study follows these definitions and uses the terms generically and interchangeably. 
1 
2 
Motives for Mergers 
and Acquisitions 
Halpern (1983) considers motivations for M&A activity from a different 
perspective. Based on the value maximization hypothesis, he discusses diverse motives 
for M&A. First, financial motivation such as redeployment of excess cash, diversification 
benefits, and bankruptcy avoidance can stimulate business acquisitions. Second, 
synergies from economies of scale, economies of scope, excess capacity in some 
production factors, and monopoly power can motivate mergers. Third, firms may engage 
in M&A activity to take advantage of an asymmetry in information. Finally, an 
acquisition can be based on the attempt by the acquirer to obtain control of the target firm. 
In addition, tax benefits could be another motivation that drives business 
combinations, even though firms may not make these deals based on tax benefits alone 
(Eccles et al., 1999). The tax motivations are illustrated in the following two activities. 
Tax Shields for Conglomeration. A conglomerate merger is a combination 
of firms that are involved in different businesses. Corporate tax benefits can motivate 
conglomerate mergers. Shih (1994) argues that conglomerate mergers create several tax 
benefits. First, conglomerate mergers improve the probability of immediately utilizing tax 
write-offs and credits. Second, the chance of permanently losing tax write-offs and 
credits in bankruptcy is reduced by these mergers. Last, by increasing the chance of tax 
deductibility for marginal interest payments and reducing the marginal net cost of debt, 
conglomerate mergers enhance the ability of the conglomerated group to write off the 
interest on additional debt. 
3 
Bankruptcy vs. Merger Choice. Bankruptcy avoidance is one of the 
numerous motivations for mergers (Halpern, 1983). One of the reasons for preferring 
merger over bankruptcy is the possible loss of potential benefits from tax loss 
carryforwards and investment tax credit carryforwards if the troubled firms declare 
bankruptcy and liquidate (Shrieves and Stevens, 1979). Pastena and Ruland (1986) apply 
Probit analysis to test the importance of three firm-related variables - revenues, financial 
leverage, and tax carryforwards - in predicting the merger/bankruptcy option, but their 
results show that the tax carryforwards variable is not statistically significant. 
Tax Benefits and Mergers 
and Acquisitions 
There are several ways that M&A may provide tax benefits to the participating 
firms. For example, Auerbach and Reishus (1988a) point out three large tax saving 
acquisitions which took advantage of tax loss and credit carryforwards. First, the Atlantic 
Richfield Company is estimated to have gained over $100 million in tax benefits when it 
merged with Anaconda Copper Mining Company in 1977. Second, the Perm Central 
Corporation acquired Marathon Manufacturing Company and GK Technologies, Inc. 
during 1979-1981 and is estimated to have saved more than $180 million in tax liabilities 
through these two deals. Third, Allied Corporation's acquisitions of Bunker Ramo 
Corporation, Fisher Scientific International, Inc., and Supron Energy Corporation during 
1981-1982 are projected to have resulted in tax benefits of over $80 million. 
Consequently, when a target firm is able to provide tax benefits to an acquiring firm, the 
acquirer might be willing to pay tax-driven price premiums. For instance, Erickson and 
Wang (2007) note that when Coca-Cola Enterprises acquired Herb Coca-Cola in 2001, 
4 
Coca-Cola Enterprises paid the Herb Coca-Cola shareholders a $100 million premium to 
obtain a beneficial step-up tax status. 
Tax Considerations. Generally, the tax benefits gained from M&A activity 
are accrued at both the corporate and the shareholder levels (Auerbach and Reishus, 
1988b). These potential tax benefits can be considered critically in terms of the following 
principal tax questions (Ginsburg and Levin, 2006, p. 1-11). First, will shareholders of 
the target firm pay tax on the appreciation of their stock? Can this gain be deferred by 
structuring the installment method, a tax-free reorganization, or a creative use of Section 
that provides non-recognition treatment? Second, does the target firm have to pay 
corporate-level tax on the appreciation of its assets? If yes, do the shareholders of the 
target firm or the acquiring firm take the burden? Third, will the acquiring firm take a 
carryover tax base or obtain a new cost basis (either a step-up or step-down) on the target 
firm's assets? Finally, if the target firm has a net operating loss (NOL), or other tax 
carryforwards, can the acquiring firm use these carryforwards? If so, what are the 
restrictions jeopardizing the acquirer from enjoying the carryforwards? 
Among these tax considerations, use of the target firm's NOL and other tax 
carryforwards to reduce tax liabilities might be the most visible attraction to an acquiring 
firm (Haw et al., 1987). Tax laws allow firms to use these tax carryforwards against their 
future earnings so that potential benefits from future tax savings make tax carryforwards 
valuable. In this study, we are particularly interested in how participating firms estimate 
and price the deferred tax accounts in M&A. Therefore, understanding the tax 
ramifications of using the target firm's tax carryforwards provides some enlightenment 
2
 Unless specified, code sections cited in this study refer to the Internal Revenue Code ("IRC") of 1986. 
3
 See Sections 39(a), 53,172(b)(1), 904(c), and 1212(a). 
5 
on how the participating firms might negotiate the value of the tax benefits given by the 
target's tax carryforwards. 
Non-Taxable vs. Taxable Mergers. Acquisitions may be classified as 
taxable or non-taxable transactions. In either category, the acquiring firm may purchase 
the assets or the stock of the target. Generally, a taxable transaction provides a step-up 
basis on the transferred assets and no transfer of tax attributes. Conversely, in a non-
taxable merger, there is no step-up in basis but tax attributes are transferred. 
Section 368(a) specifies seven types of corporate reorganizations that qualify as 
nontaxable transactions: 1) "Type A:" a statutory merger or consolidation; 2) "Type B:" 
the acquisition in which the buyer uses solely voting-stock-for-stock exchange; 3) "Type 
C:" an acquisition where the purchasing firm exchanges solely its voting stock for 
substantially all of the seller's properties;4 4) "Type D:" a transfer of all or part of a 
company's assets to another firm when the original corporation's shareholders control the 
new company immediately after the transfer. A "Type D" reorganization could be either 
"acquisitive" or "divisive;"5 5) "Type E:" a recapitalization; 6) "Type F:" a mere change 
in identity, form, or place of organization of the company; and, 7) "Type G:" the transfer 
by a firm of all or part of its assets to another corporation in a bankruptcy or similar 
situation. In addition, a qualified tax-free reorganization has to meet several general 
requirements such as having a plan of reorganization, passing the continuity of interest 
and the continuity of business enterprise tests, possessing a sound business purpose, and 
avoiding the step transaction doctrine (Hoffman et al., 2006). 
4
 There is no statutory definition of "substantially all." However, the IRS expects assets representing at 
least 90 percent of the fair market value of the net assets and at least 70 percent of the fair market value of 
the gross assets held by the target to be transferred. See, Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2 C.B. 568, amplified by 
Rev. Proc. 86-42,1986-2 C.B. 722. 
5
 There are three types of "divisive Type D" reorganizations: spin-off, split-off, and split-up. 
6 
As a general rule, when a transaction is qualified as a Section 368 reorganization, 
the participating firms do not recognize gain or loss.6 Likewise, subject to some 
exceptions, shareholders of the firms involved in a non-taxable reorganization do not 
recognize gain or loss on the exchange of their stock.7 The assets transferred from the 
target firm to the acquirer carry over their basis, while the basis might be increased by 
Q 
any gain recognized by the target firm in the transaction. When an acquisition occurs in 
the "Type A," "Type C," acquisitive "Type D," "Type F," or "Type G," the acquiring 
firm succeeds to the target firm's tax attributes on the assets transferred.9 That is, NOL 
and other carryforwards such as net capital loss, general business credit, foreign tax credit, 
and alternative minimum tax credit (Ginsburg and Levin, 2006, p. 12-149) can be carried 
over to and used by the acquirer.10 Nevertheless, carryovers of a target firm's tax 
carryforwards to the acquirer are not allowed if the principal purpose of the overall 
transaction is to avoid tax by securing the benefit of the target firm's carryforwards.11 On 
the other hand, a target firm must generally recognize full gain or loss when disposing of 
its assets in a taxable transaction. Similarly, shareholders of the target firm must 
generally realize gain or loss on any sale or exchange of their target firm stock in a 
taxable acquisition. 
The participating firms can choose whether to take a step-up in tax basis or a 
carryover tax basis on the target firm's assets through different transaction structures. 
Ginsburg and Levin (2006, p. 4-109) provide two structuring formats of obtaining a step-
up tax basis. First, the acquirer can either acquire the target firm's assets in a taxable 
6
 Section 361(a). 
7
 Section 354(a)(1). 
8
 Section 362(b). 
9
 Section 381(a). 
10
 Section 381. 
11
 Section 269(a). 
19 
forward merger or purchase the target firm's assets. Second, with Sections 338 or 
338(h)(10) elections, the acquiring company buys the target firm's stock in a taxable 
reverse subsidiary merger or purchases the target firm's stock.13 Nevertheless, if a 
carryover tax basis of the target firm's assets is desirable, the acquiring firm will use the 
second structuring format but without a Section 338 or 338(h)(10) election. An acquiring 
firm is generally able to use the target firm's tax carryforwards if the acquirer purchases 
the target firm's stock in a non-taxable transaction without making a Section 338 election 
to treat the acquisition as an asset purchase. In contrast, an acquirer will not succeed to 
the target firm's tax attributes in a taxable asset purchase. 
See Table 1.1 for a summary of different treatments between financial and tax 
accountings regarding target firm's tax attributes. For numeric examples, see Appendix. 
Table 1.2 presents a flow chart that clarifies the relationships among types of deals, tax 
consequences, and availability of target firms' tax attribution transfers. 
12
 In a forward merger, the target firm ceases to exist and is merged into the acquirer or a subsidiary of the 
acquirer. Since the later involves three parties, it is called a "triangular merger." 
13
 In a reverse subsidiary merger, a subsidiary of the acquirer is merged into the target firm such that the 
latter is the surviving entity. A reverse subsidiary merger usually is employed to avoid the transfer of 
contracts and licenses held by the target firm. 
8 
Table 1.1 Financial and Tax Accounting in M&A 
Acquirer 
Taxable M&A 
Financial (Book): SFAS No. 141 requires 
that the assets and liabilities acquired 
must be recorded at their fair market 
value to the acquiring firm. 
Basis of acquired assets: Step-up. 
NOL carryforwards: not available to 
acquirer. 
Other carryforwards: not available to 
acquirer. 
Tax: Step-up. 
Tax basis of acquired assets: Step-up. 
NOL carryforwards: not available to 
acquirer. 
Other carryforwards: not available to 
acquirer. 
Non-Taxable M&AT 
Financial (Book): SFAS No. 141 requires 
that the assets and liabilities acquired 
must be recorded at their fair market 
value to the acquiring firm. 
Basis of acquired assets: Step-up. 
NOL carryforwards: transferred to 
acquirer. 
Other carryforwards: transferred to 
acquirer. 
Tax: Tax attributes succeed. 
Tax basis of acquired assets: transferred 
to acquirer. 
NOL carryforwards: transferred to 
acquirer. 
Other carryforwards: transferred to 
acquirer. 
Target and Shareholders 
Target: Gains (losses) are recognized. 
NOL carryforwards: available to target. 
Other carryforwards: available to target. 
Target: No gains (losses) are recognized. 
NOL carryforwards: transferred to 
acquirer. 
Other carryforwards: transferred to 
acquirer. 
Shareholders: Gains (losses) are I Shareholders: No gains (losses) are 
recognized according to shareholder's recognized. Shareholder's basis in the 
basis in the target stock. target stock becomes the new basis in the 
1 acquirer's stock. 
NOL and tax credit carryforwards are not transferred to the acquirer if the acquisition is classified as a 
Type B, divisive Type D, or Type E reorganization. 
9 
Table 1.2 Type of Deals, Tax Consequences, and Tax Attribute Transfers 
Is the transaction 
qualified as a Section 
368 reorganization? 
Yes 
Are Section 338 or 
338(h)(10) elected? 
No 
Is the transaction 
classified as a Type 
B, Divisive Type D, 








Acquirer takes a step-up tax 
basis on the acquired assets. 
Target's NOL and tax credit 
carryforwards do not 




Acquirer takes a step-up tax 
basis on the acquired assets. 
Target's NOL and tax credit 
carryforwards are not 




Target's tax basis on assets 
transfers to the acquirer. 
However, target's NOL and 
tax credit carryforwards are 
not transferred to the 
acquirer.' 
Target's tax basis on assets 
transfers to the acquirer. 
Also, target's NOL and tax 
credit carryforwards are 
transferred to the acquirer. ^  
T Section 381(a). 
Limitation on Tax Benefits. Although Auerbach and Reishus (1988a) find 
that tax carryforwards may provide tax-savings in M&A activity, their study suggests no 
apparent evidence that the utilization of tax credits and tax losses plays an important role 
10 
in affecting merger activity. However, Congress has been concerned with the tax benefits 
taken by merging firms and has attempted to eliminate the tax incentives from business 
combinations. As a result, numerous provisions have been established to limit the use of 
NOL and other tax carryforwards. For example, Section 382 is one of the complex 
provisions applicable to NOL carryforwards and this section is also effective to other tax 
carryforwards through Section 383. Section 382 limits the amount of NOLs that can be 
utilized each year by the successor corporation. Generally, the Section 382 limitation 
applies when there has been an ownership change for the target's common shareholders 
of more than 50 percent.15 Section 382 restricts the use of NOL carryforwards in several 
ways. First, the NOL carryforwards are disallowed if the acquirer fails to satisfy the 
continuity of business enterprise requirement for at least two years after the change 
date.16 Second, the NOL carryforwards cannot be carried back to a prior acquiring 
corporation tax year (that is, it can only be used prospectively). Third, the annual amount 
of NOL carryforwards available to the acquirer is limited to the market value of the target 
firm multiplied by the long-term tax-exempt rate. The long-term tax-exempt rate is the 
highest adjusted Federal long-term rate for the previous three-month period. Last, the 
amount of NOLs available to the acquirer in the change year is proportional to the 
remaining days after the change date. 
14
 See, for example, Sections 172(b)(1)(E), 269, 381, 382, 383, and 384. 
15
 An ownership change exists where there is either an owner shift involving 5-percent shareholder or an 
equity structure shift as defined in Section 382(g). An owner shift involving 5-percent shareholder occurs 
where the common stock ownership of one or more 5-percent shareholders changes. Equity structure 
shift means any tax free reorganization under Section 368, but excluding divisive "Type D," "Type G," 
and "Type F" reorganizations. See, Hoffman et al. (2006). 
16
 Continuity of business enterprise requires that the successor corporation either continues the target 
corporation's historic business or uses a significant portion of the target firm's historic assets in a business. 
See, Reg. 1.368-l(d)(l). 
11 
The effectiveness of the Section 382 limitation has been empirically investigated. 
Moore and Pruitt (1987) test the impact of the passage of the revised Section 382 of the 
Tax Reform Act of 1976 (TRA'76) which was recast to restrict the use of NOL 
carryforwards obtained through M&A. They find that this Section 382 revision reduced 
the present value of the loss firms' NOLs by limiting the use of the NOL carryforwards 
and, thereby, increasing the probability of their expiration. That is, Section 382 as revised 
under TRA'76 is effective in reducing the potential tax benefits provided by the NOL 
carryforwards. 
The preceding discussion describes the relationship between tax benefits of a 
target firm's tax carryforwards and M&A activity. The tax considerations, tax benefits, 
and limitations on the use of a target's tax carryforwards have been reviewed. This 
discussion provides a basis for the expectation of why an acquirer may be willing to pay a 
price for tax benefits acquired in an M&A transaction. 
Value Relevance of 
Deferred Taxes 
Target firms' tax carryforwards are one of the tax benefits that acquiring firms 
may obtain in M&A. While Congress restricted this benefit via the aforementioned 
Section 382 limitations, the easy identification of tax carryforwards may make it likely 
that participating firms could value these carryforwards in estimating the total value of 
target. Auerbach and Reishus (1988a) estimate that the average size of the tax benefits 
from tax loss and credit carryforwards obtained by acquiring firms is around 10% of the 
target firm's total market value. Nevertheless, the question of how an acquirer valuates 
and prices a target firm's tax carryforwards, as well as other deferred tax components, is 
12 
not adequately addressed in their study. Analyzing the deferred tax accounts provides 
insights into this issue. 
Deferred Tax Accounts.While firms must follow GAAP for financial 
reporting, tax accounting must follow the Internal Revenue Code. Tax laws often differ 
from the recognition and measurement requirements of financial accounting standards. 
Consequently, accounting for financial reporting purposes and accounting for tax 
purposes are different. To address and account for the differences between GAAP 
reporting and tax accounting, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued 
the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 109 (SFAS No. 109), "Accounting 
for Income Taxes" which suspended Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 11 (APB 
No. 11), "Accounting for Income Taxes" (APB, 1967). Because SFAS No. 109 requires 
firms to recognize the amount of taxes payable or refundable for the current year and 
deferred tax liabilities and assets for the future tax consequences of transactions that have 
been recognized in the firms' financial statements or tax returns, the FASB believes that 
SFAS No. 109 produces the most useful and understandable information (SFAS No. 109, 
par. 63). Ayers (1998) provides empirical evidence that SFAS No. 109 gives incremental 
value relevant information relative to APB No. 11. 
Differences between the amount of income tax payable (the amount calculated 
under tax laws) and the amount of income tax expense (the amount computed under 
GAAP) can be classified as either permanent differences or temporary differences. 
Permanent differences are amounts used to calculate income tax expense for financial 
reporting purposes but not used to determine income tax payable for tax purposes or vice 
versa (Norton et al., 2007, p. 765). A temporary difference is defined as "a difference 
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between the tax basis of an asset or liability and its reported amount in the financial 
statements that will result in taxable or deductible amounts in future years" (SFAS No. 
109, par 289). The deferred tax account, which appears on the balance sheet as either a 
deferred tax asset or a deferred tax liability, reflects only the tax impact of temporary 
differences (and not permanent differences) between the financial accounting and tax 
accounting. 
A deferred tax liability refers to the increase in taxes payable in future years as a 
result of temporary taxable differences existing at the end of the current year. In contrast, 
a deferred tax asset indicates the increase in taxes refundable or saved in future years as a 
result of temporary deductible differences existing at the end of the taxable year (Kieso et 
al., 2007, p. 967). Furthermore, firms are required to measure deferred tax assets and 
liabilities at the tax rate expected to be applicable in the future rather than at the tax rate 
applicable during the year the amounts originated (SFAS No. 109, par 27). Also, while 
the deferred tax liability account is not subject to valuation adjustments, the deferred tax 
asset account should be reduced by a valuation allowance. If, based on all available 
positive and negative evidence, it is more likely than not (a likelihood of more than 50 
percent) that some portion or all of the deferred tax assets will not be realized, a valuation 
allowance should be recognized (SFAS No. 109, par 17). Moreover, the following four 
sources of taxable income may be viewed as sufficient enough to realize a tax benefit for 
deductible temporary differences: 1) Future reversals of existing taxable temporary 
differences; 2) Future taxable income exclusive of reversing temporary differences and 
carryforwards; 3) Taxable income in prior carryback year(s) if the carryback is permitted 
under the tax laws; and, 4) Tax-planning strategies such as accelerating taxable amounts 
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to utilize expiring carryforwards, changing the character of taxable or deductible amounts 
from ordinary income/loss to capital gain/loss, and switching from tax-exempt to taxable 
investments (SFAS No. 109, par 21). Meanwhile, the total amount of deferred taxes must 
be separated into current and noncurrent parts, of which the classification as current or 
noncurrent should generally rely on the classification of the related asset or liability that 
gave rise to the temporary difference (SFAS No. 109, par 41). Further, companies are 
required to disclose in the financial statements the approximate tax effect of each type of 
temporary difference and carryforward that gives rise to a significant portion of deferred 
tax liabilities and deferred tax assets (SFAS No. 109, par 43). Therefore, the financial 
statement users can notice the impact of deferred taxes on the balance sheet and the 
income statement. These tax disclosures also provide important information for business 
valuation purposes (Weber and Wheeler, 1992). 
Value Relevance of Tax Disclosures. In Statement of Financial 
Accounting Concepts No. 2 (SFAC No. 2), "Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting 
Information", the FASB states the objective of financial reporting is to provide useful 
information for decision-making of the existing and potential financial statement users 
(FASB, 1980). Income tax information can serve the functions of assessing quality of 
earnings, making better predictions of future cash flows, and predicting future cash flows 
from operating loss carryforwards (Kieso et al., 2005). This tax information is needed for 
investors, creditors, and acquirers to assess the value of the business and, thereby, make 
their decisions. That is, financial statement users should be able to utilize the disclosed 
income tax information to explore significant economic transactions of the companies 
they are interested in (Weber and Wheeler, 1992). Therefore, income tax information 
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should be able to provide value relevant knowledge to financial statement users. 
Empirical studies (e.g., Givoly and Hayn, 1992; Chaney and Jeter, 1994; Amir et al., 
1997; Ayers, 1998) have confirmed that while making investment and pricing decisions, 
the market indeed considers the income tax information provided in financial statements 
and prices the net deferred tax account as well as its components. However, whether an 
acquiring firm uses this information to price a target firm's deferred tax accounts in 
M&A has not yet been explored. 
Significance of the Problem 
The central concern in an M&A transaction is how to determine the economic 
benefits and burdens in the transaction and allocate them among the participating parties 
(Ginsburg and Levin, 2006, p. 1-10). Moreover, the impact of tax laws is one of the 
economic factors which a business would consider in an M&A activity. Accordingly, the 
question of how the merging firms ascertain and price the potential tax benefits of the 
acquisition transaction is worthy of further investigation. 
SFAC No. 2 depicts the objective of financial reporting as providing useful 
information for decision-making. At least two prior research streams have shown that 
deferred tax accounts provide value relevant information to the market. First, research in 
value relevance of deferred taxes (e.g., Givoly and Hayn, 1992; Chaney and Jetter, 1997; 
Amir et al., 1997; Ayers, 1998) has examined the relationship between deferred taxes and 
stock price. Generally, the findings indicate that deferred taxes are appropriately valued 
and included in the stock price. Second, other studies (e.g., Moore and Pruitt, 1987; Haw 
et al., 1987) identify the impact of tax benefits associated with NOL carryforwards on the 
stock price with/without the presence of M&A activity. By and large, the results of these 
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studies show that NOL carryforwards are associated with a higher stock price or 
acquisition premium. The first research stream (e.g., Amir et al., 1997; Amir and 
Sougiannis, 1999; Zeng, 2003) relates deferred tax accounts to stock price outside the 
scope of M&A activity. The second research stream, using the event study method, 
focuses on the market valuation to NOL carryforwards in M&A activity. The purpose of 
the current study is to apply the value relevance method used in the first research stream 
to the M&A setting. 
Studying the value relevance of deferred taxes in mergers and acquisitions is very 
important in the following perspectives. First, M&A is currently a very significant 
business activity. This study can improve our knowledge of M&A activity, especially the 
pricing of target firms' deferred taxes. Second, Congress is concerned with merging firms 
taking tax advantages of loss firms' tax carryforwards. Enactment of the strictly revised 
Section 382 limitations was an attempt to mitigate this concern. However, Moore and 
Pruitt (1987) find that Section 382 of TRA'76 has significant influence on this issue, but 
Plummer and Robinson (1990) are skeptical on the necessity of imposing these 
limitations. Although prior research has investigated the viewpoint of the market on 
pricing firms' NOL carryforwards, whether participating firms give value to NOL and 
other tax carryforwards has not been examined. Third, this study provides an opportunity 
to examine the relevance of income tax information, i.e., whether SFAS No. 109 provides 
the merging firms with value relevant tax information. 
Section 382 was enacted in the IRC of 1939. However, the restriction on the use of NOL carryforwards 
was amended for several times. Section 382 limitations revised by TRA'76 and TRA'86 are stricter than 
that in the 1954 Code prior to 1977. 
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Objectives of the Study 
The objective of this study is twofold. First, this study expands the research of 
value relevance of deferred taxes to M&A activity. Specifically, merging firms' 
evaluation of, rather than the market's reaction to, deferred tax accounts are examined. 
Therefore, this paper can provide insights on how participating firms consider the tax 
benefits associated with tax carryforwards. Second, this study avoids the methodological 
issue of the market's early response to an anticipated event. The anticipation effect may 
be most serious for firms with tax carryforwards prior to the merger announcement 
(Plummer and Robinson, 1990). A valuation model based on the Feltham-Ohlson (1995) 
model is employed to investigate the value relevance of tax information and eliminate the 
anticipation effect that may influence the findings of event studies. 
Research Focus 
Research Question 1 
The first research question is to determine whether deferred tax assets (liabilities) 
of a target firm are valued as assets (liabilities) in mergers and acquisitions. Investors, 
financial analysts, and creditors use financial ratios to assess a firm's value. However, 
financial ratios may change if the users make adjustments to financial statement items. 
For example, Comiskey and Mulford (1994) suggest that lenders should deduct deferred-
tax assets either in whole, or in part, when calculating the tangible net worth of a firm 
because the realization of benefits from deferred tax assets is subject to uncertainty. Any 
adjustment to the reported numbers will affect the ratios used for valuation. 
Prior research (e.g., Amir et al., 1997; Ayers, 1998) shows that the stock market 
views the deferred tax assets, positively. Also, investors consider deferred tax liabilities 
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as real liabilities (Givoly and Hayn, 1992; Chaney and Jetter, 1994; Ayers, 1998; Citron, 
2001). Although these studies are not related to M&A activity, it is expected that merging 
firms consider deferred tax assets (liabilities) as real assets (liabilities) in non-taxable 
acquisitions. However, the coefficients relating tax attribute to price in this study may 
vary from those found in prior research because of Section 382 limitations. Because 
Section 382 limitations restrict the annual amount of target firms' NOL carryforwards 
that can be used by acquiring firms, the tax attributes may be less valuable in M&A than 
1X 
they would be in a going concern situation. 
Research Question 2 
Whether a target firm's valuation allowance account is priced in a merger is the 
second research question. The valuation allowance is a contra deferred tax asset account. 
Ayers (1998) shows that the market prices the valuation allowance account negatively 
against the deferred tax assets account. However, because of investors' failure to assign a 
positive value to the deferred tax assets from losses and credit carryforwards, Amir et al. 
(1997) find that it is difficult to interpret the coefficients on the valuation allowance 
account. Consistent with prior research, valuation allowances are expected to be priced 
negatively in non-taxable acquisitions. 
Research Question 3 
The third research question specifically investigates how a target firm's NOL and 
tax credit carryforwards are priced. NOL carryforwards are the most visible tax benefit 
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 Information shown in the financial statements is under "the going concern" assumption. If a firm is in 
liquidation or is expected to enter liquidation, emphasis shifts from performance to liquidation. Regarding 
this shift, SFAC No. 1 states that the objectives of financial reporting do not necessarily change, but the 
information that is relevant to those objectives may differ (FASB 1978, footnote 10). Therefore, if 
performance and acquisition have different emphases, the needed relevant information for performance 
and acquisition could be different. 
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that a loss firm can provide in M&A activity, and consequently, it has raised 
Congressional concern for merging firms taking tax advantages of this tax attribute. 
While unrelated to the M&A context, Zeng (2003) shows that NOL carryforwards, but 
not investment tax credit carryforwards, enhance firm market value. Amir et al. (1997) 
investigate the value relevance of deferred taxes and find that investors fail to assign a 
positive value to the NOL and tax credit carryforwards accounts. They suggest that the 
market does not expect these carryforwards to be utilized. However, these carryforwards 
may be more valuable in an M&A setting when merged into a profitable acquiring firm 
that can take advantage of them. 
Within the scope of M&A research, the findings are inconsistent. Although 
Moore and Pruitt (1987) demonstrate that NOL carryforwards are priced by the market in 
connection with potential mergers, Plummer and Robinson (1990) indicate the difference 
of acquisition premiums between target firms with and without NOL carryforwards is not 
statistically significant. Although prior studies are split in whether a firm's NOL and tax 
credit carryforwards are valued by the market, it is expected that a target firm's NOL and 
tax credit carryforwards are priced by participating firms in non-taxable acquisitions. 
There are two reasons to support this expectation. First, Moore and Pruitt (1987) show 
that stock price is related to firm's NOL carryforwards in the M&A context. Second, the 
insignificant relationship between acquisition premiums and NOL carryforwards in the 
Plummer and Robinson (1990) event study might arise from the anticipation effect. 
Organization of Dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter 1 serves as an introduction 
to the topics of deferred taxes and mergers movements and includes a discussion of the 
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relation between tax attributes and merger activities. The relevance and purpose of the 
study are also presented. Chapter 2 reviews the prior empirical research in the areas of 
value-relevance of deferred taxes and effects of deferred taxes on mergers and 
acquisitions. Chapter 3 presents the research questions and hypotheses to be investigated 
and discusses the data and the research methodology used in this study. Chapter 4 reports 
descriptive statistics and the results of the hypothesis tests. Last, Chapter 5 contains 
analyses and discussions of the research findings, conclusions, suggestions for future 
research opportunities, and notes the limitations of this study. 
CHAPTER 2 
SELECTED LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior research is selectively reviewed in two areas: value relevance of deferred 
taxes and effects of deferred taxes on mergers and acquisitions. The first category can 
facilitate an understanding of how the market evaluates deferred tax accounts. The 
second provides insights into the methodology used to examine the impact of deferred 
taxes on M&A activity. 
Research on Value Relevance 
of Deferred Taxes 
Event Studies 
Givoly and Havn. Givoly and Hayn (1991) investigate the effects of the 
passage of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA'86) on the equity values of publicly 
traded companies. They argue that since TRA'86 amends some provisions related to the 
deferred tax accounts, the passage of TRA'86 could impact the market's valuation of 
these accounts. First, NOL carryforwards would provide less tax savings because of tax 
rate reduction and additional restrictions on the use of NOL carryforwards in acquisitions 
under TRA'86. Second, the decrease in the tax rate would lead to a decline in the 
valuation of deferred tax liabilities. Third, the investment tax credit, which previously 
acted as an important tax shield, was repealed. Therefore, when the likelihood of passing 
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TRA'86 increased, the abnormal return on a firm's stock was expected to relate 
negatively to the NOL carryforwards and investment tax credit, but positively to the 
deferred tax liability While identifying ten TRA'86 impact subperiods, Givoly and Hayn 
employ the event study methodology and confirm their expectations. 
Givoly and Hayn (1992) is closely related to Givoly and Hayn (1991) in terms of 
methodology and sample. However, although Givoly and Hayn (1991) apply firm-
specific variables to explain the stock price response to TRA'86, Givoly and Hayn (1992) 
use the passage of TRA'86 as a vehicle to assess whether the deferred tax liability is 
viewed by the market as a real liability. Givoly and Hayn (1992) argue that if the deferred 
tax liability is considered a real liability, the tax rate cut of TRA'86 would proportionally 
reduce the market value of liabilities and correspondingly increase the market value of 
equity. Further, the increase in the equity value of an individual company would depend 
on how investors discount its liabilities. Specifically, the discount factor is a function of 
the expected growth rate in the deferred tax liability and the likelihood of future losses. 
Meanwhile, several variables, such as investment tax credits, NOL carryforwards, etc., 
were incorporated in the model to control the effect of TRA'86 on stock prices. Their 
findings show that, on average, one dollar of deferred tax liability is valued by investors 
at about 56 cents. 
Chaney and Jeter. Using an event study, Chaney and Jeter (1994) argue that 
deferred taxes are associated with stock returns after controlling for the net income 
computed without the deferred tax component (the pseudo-net income). Further, they 
predict that, due to the delayed nature of the future tax payment, the return response to 
the deferred taxes should be weaker than that for other components. Also, they anticipate 
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that the market should perceive the recurring portion of deferred taxes differently in 
terms of the implications of future tax payments when compared to the nonrecurring 
portion. Moreover, whether the market response differs between firms with different 
levels of variance in unexpected deferred taxes is examined in their study. 
The test period includes the years 1969-1985, during which firms were required to 
report deferred taxes in compliance with APB Opinion No. 11. The results show that for 
8 of the 17 years examined, the coefficient on deferred taxes is negatively significant at 
the 0.10 level. Thus, they suggest that the deferred tax component provides incremental 
information to the market. However, an F-test between the full model and reduced model 
reveals that the coefficient of the deferred tax component is significantly smaller in 
absolute value than that of the pseudo-net income in only three years. Furthermore, their 
findings suggest that the market's reaction to the nonrecurring deferred tax items is not 
significantly different from that to the recurring deferred tax component. Evidence is 
presented that the market's response is stronger for firms with less volatility in deferred 
taxes. 
Espahbodi et al. Using an event study, Espahbodi et al. (1995) examine the 
market reaction around the issuance of the Exposure Drafts leading to SFAS No. 96 and 
No. 109. Because of the decrease in maximum tax rates from 46 percent to 34 percent, a 
change from APB Opinion No. 11 to either SFAS No. 96 or No. 109 should lead most 
companies to see an increase in earnings and a reduction in liability. Furthermore, they 
expect the increase in stock prices to be more pronounced for firms with a larger deferred 
tax liability to total assets and firms with higher NOL carryforwards to total assets. 
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Three related events - two exposure drafts leading to SFAS No. 96 and No. 109 
and the formal vote by the FASB to revise SFAS No. 96 - are considered. The 
Multivariate Regression Model (Schipper and Thompson, 1983) is employed to test the 
impact of these three events on stock prices. Also, the portfolio weighting procedure 
(Sefcik and Thompson, 1986) is used to evaluate the relative importance of different firm 
characteristics (e.g., deferred tax liability, NOL carryforwards, etc.) in explaining the 
market reaction to the three events. 
Their findings reveal significantly abnormal returns around the three events. Also, 
they note that firms with the following characteristics are most favorably affected by the 
new standard announcements: small, offering postretirement benefits, high debt ratios, 
high deferred tax liability and NOL carryforwards over total assets, and using the 
purchase method of acquisition. 
Price Valuation Models 
Amir et al. Amir et al. (1997) investigate the market valuation of deferred taxes 
and their components, which include seven items: 1) depreciation and amortization, 2) 
losses, credits, and alternative minimum taxes carryforwards, 3) restructuring charges, 4) 
environmental charges, 5) employee benefits, 6) valuation allowance required by SFAS 
No. 109, and 7) all other components. 
Using a variant of the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) model, Amir et al. (1997) relate 
the market value of equity to the current value of net operating assets, net financial assets, 
abnormal operating earnings, and net deferred taxes. Also, industry effects were 
controlled for via adding industry dummy variables to each independent variable, except 
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for net financial assets. Their findings show that the marginal value of a dollar of net 
deferred taxes is $1.20, which is significantly above one at the 0.05 level. 
Furthermore, Amir et al. (1997) decompose the net deferred taxes into seven 
items to examine the incremental information content of these components. Their results 
indicate that deferred taxes from losses and credit carryforwards are not significant. 
Therefore, they suggest that investors do not expect these carryforwards to be utilized. 
Moreover, instead of using two separate components, they combine deferred taxes from 
losses and credits carryforwards with the valuation allowance and, then, rerun the model. 
The coefficients on this new variable are not significant. Accordingly, they interpret the 
result as net tax losses carryforwards (i.e., losses and credit carryforwards minus the 
valuation allowance) are not valued as real assets. 
Amir and Sougiannis. Amir and Sougiannis (1999) examine the 
interpretations of financial analysts and investors on tax carryforward information. They 
distinguish two conflicting roles of deferred taxes in valuation. First, tax carryforwards 
represent future tax savings so that they should be positively valued as assets. On the 
other hand, deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards may signal a higher likelihood of 
future losses and could negatively impact stock price. 
Using the Feltham-Ohlson (1995) model, Amir and Sougiannis (1999) relate 
analysts' forecast to deferred taxes, adjusted book value (book value minus deferred 
taxes), and abnormal earnings. Also, deferred taxes are decomposed into three 
components: losses and credits carryforwards, valuation allowance, and all other deferred 
taxes. They argue that if analysts use the deferred tax carryforwards information as a 
signal of future losses, abnormal earnings and book value will be considered as less 
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valuable for firms with deferred tax carryforwards. Meanwhile, for the investigation of 
investors' valuation of deferred taxes, stock price is related to deferred taxes, adjusted 
book value, and the present value of expected abnormal earnings. Similarly, deferred 
taxes are decomposed into the three aforementioned components. They expect that 
investors will discount the expected earnings and the adjusted book value for firms with 
deferred tax carryforwards, compared to those without such carryforwards. 
Their initial sample is identical to the one used by Amir et al. (1997). The results 
suggest analysts consider abnormal earnings and adjusted book value of firms with tax 
carryforwards less valuable than those of firms without carryforwards. In addition, the 
deferred tax assets from NOL and tax credit carryforwards are viewed as assets but with 
small magnitude and weak significance levels and the valuation allowance component is 
unstable and insignificant. Furthermore, the findings indicate that investors reduce stock 
price in accordance with the likelihood of utilizing tax carryforwards. Investors price the 
adjusted book value of firms with deferred taxes less than those of firms without deferred 
taxes, and, in contrast, price the expected earnings higher for firms with deferred taxes 
than those without such tax carryforwards. 
Zeng. Using Canadian data, Zeng (2003) investigates the value relevance of loss 
carryforwards. He extends the Feltham-Ohlson (1995) model by adding a variable for 
corporate taxation. That is, firm market value is related to the current book value, the 
present value of the expected future after-tax abnormal earnings, and the present value of 
the expected future tax reductions. Further, he decomposes the loss carryforwards into 
two items: NOL carryforwards and capital loss carryforwards. 
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The results show that the total loss carryforwards are positively and significantly 
related to stock price suggesting that the loss carryforwards increase a firm's market 
value. However, after the decomposition, the findings indicate that while the coefficients 
on the NOL carryforwards are significant, the coefficients on capital loss carryforwards 
are not. Zeng interprets this result as suggesting that the market does not expect these 
capital losses to be realized in future. After further detailed decomposition and analysis of 
the NOL carryforwards account, he finds that the portion of NOL carryforwards which 
occurred in Canada, and would not expire soon, significantly increased a firm's market 
value. 
Bauman and Das. Bauman and Das (2004) assess the association between 
expectations of future profitability and the stock prices of Internet firms before and after 
the bubble burst in 2000. Because net deferred tax assets represent managers' perspective 
on the expectation of future profitability, they actually investigate the relationship 
between deferred tax assets and stock price. Specifically, Bauman and Das argue that the 
pre-correction valuation of deferred tax assets exceeds the post-correction valuation. 
Because Internet firms usually record valuation allowances in amounts equal, or 
close, to gross deferred tax assets, multicollinearity can be a severe issue in their model. 
To solve this issue, two dummy variables, DTA-FULL and DTA-PART, are included in 
the model. DTA-FULL equals to 1 if valuation allowance is the same as the net deferred 
tax assets. In contrast, DTA-PART is 1 if valuation allowance is not equal to the net 
deferred tax assets. Also, based on Internet industry segments, Bauman and Das 
categorize the full sample into two groups: web traffic sensitive firms and others. 
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The results show that both DTA-FULL and DTA-PART are significantly, 
positively related to stock price irrespective of whether before or after the bubble burst or 
whether in traffic sensitive or non-traffic sensitive groups. Furthermore, the findings 
indicate that in the full sample DTA-FULL increases in both magnitude and significance 
in the post-correction valuation, but the estimate is not significantly larger than the pre-
correction estimate. However, in the traffic sensitive group, the coefficient of DTA-
FULL in post-correction is significantly larger than that in pre-correction. Bauman and 
Das interpret the shift in valuation as an implication that investors in Internet firms 
increased their relative focus on future profitability as a value driver. 
Summary of Research on Value 
Relevance of Deferred Taxes 
Prior research in the non-M&A arena indicates that deferred taxes, as well as its 
components (e.g., NOL carryforwards), provide value relevant information to the market, 
although the effect of the valuation allowance is mixed. Two methodologies commonly 
employed in this research stream are event studies and price valuation models. However, 
event studies dominate the research on the effects of deferred taxes in the M&A context 
that is discussed below. Price valuation models have not yet been applied in M&A related 
research. 
Research on Effects of Deferred 
Taxes in M & A 
Tax Benefits 
Auerbach and Reishus (1988a). Auerbach and Reishus (1988a) assess the 
potential tax benefits that merging firms could have gained from losses and tax credits. 
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Depending on the tax status of firms before mergers, they classify firms in their sample 
into four groups. Group I firms have positive federal taxes payable and no tax credit 
carryforwards. Firms in Group II have no current federal taxes but are able to fully carry 
back current losses and credits against taxable incomes in prior years. Group III contains 
firms with tax credit carryforwards but no loss carryforwards. Group IV firms possess 
both loss and tax credit carryforwards. Conceptually, only mergers between firms from 
Group I and those from groups III and IV would provide tax benefits associated with tax 
loss and credit carryforwards. 
Assuming that Group I firms maintain their taxable incomes at the same level as 
that prior to the mergers, Auerbach and Reishus (1988a) measure tax benefits as the 
maximum amount that could be used by the combined firm over a three-year period. 
Their findings indicate that nearly one fifth of the mergers seize the tax benefits with the 
average size around one tenth of the target firm's market value. However, in their 
calculation, potential restrictions under Sections 269 and 382 of the IRC of 1954 are not 
taken into account.19 As a result, the actual tax benefits should be less when these 
constraints are considered. 
Auerbach and Reishus (1988b). Auerbach and Reishus (1988b) employ 
the same dataset as Auerbach and Reishus (1988a) and estimate the tax benefits from tax 
loss and credit carryforwards in a different manner. Namely, tax benefits are calculated as 
the present value of taxes saved through the use of the existing tax carryforwards. The 
results show that the average net present value of tax benefits is 13.7 percent of the 
19
 Section 382 of TRA'76 was not actually enacted until January, 1984 (Moore and Pruitt, 1987). Therefore, 
the Section 382 of the IRC of 1954 was effective during the sample period (1968-1983) in Auerbach and 
Reishus (1988a). 
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market value of the target firm. They conclude that there is no strong evidence that the 
utilization of tax losses and credit carryforwards play an important role in affecting 
merger activity. First, the percentage of the sample firms with tax loss carryforwards is 
roughly equivalent, compared to Auerbach and Poterba (1987) where M&A is not 
involved. Second, if tax benefits from tax carryforwards are an important merger 
motivation, the number of non-taxable transactions should be larger than the number of 
taxable transactions. However, a logit model does not detect any significant relation 
between the type of transaction and the presence and size of tax benefits. 
Auerbach and Reishus (1988c). Although Auerbach and Reishus (1988a) 
find that one fifth of the acquisitions gain tax benefits from tax loss carryforwards and 
credits, they are concerned with whether the availability of the tax benefits have 
significantly impacted the frequency and pattern of mergers. Therefore, Auerbach and 
Reishus (1988c) compare the actual merger sample with "pseudomergers," mergers 
which did not occur but were drawn from random combinations of firms. That is, they 
create a corresponding "pseudomerger" for each of the 316 actual merger cases on hand. 
A "pseudotarget" firm and a "pseudoparent" firm are randomly selected from all firms in 
Compustat in terms of the same size class and year as the real target and acquirer, 
respectively. 
Following a multinominal logit model, Auerbach and Reishus (1988c) calculate 
the potential tax benefits from the transfer of tax loss carryforwards and credits between 
parent and target firms. These estimations are performed for both actual mergers and 
pseudomergers. The results show that 19.3 percent of the real merger sample contains a 
tax benefit with a mean weighted gain of 10.5 percent of the target's market value. 
31 
Likewise, 19.2 percent of the pseudomergers exhibit a tax gain of which the weighted 
mean is 7.8 percent of the market value of the pseudotarget. Since the tax benefits from 
the actual merger sample and pseudomergers are remarkably similar, they suggest that 
the transfer of tax loss carryforwards and credits may not be an important factor in 
initiating merger activity. 
Capital Market Reaction 
Moore and Pruitt. Moore and Pruitt (1987) investigate the capital market 
pricing of the NOLs accrued by loss firms and the likelihood of acquisition premiums 
attributable to the NOLs. The passage of the revised Section 382 in TRA'76 on October 
5, 1976, is used as a vehicle for the event study. Essentially, this revision reduces the tax 
incentives for profitable firms to merge with loss firms in an attempt to secure the NOL 
carryforwards of the target firms. Naturally, how the market reacts to this revised section 
can assist in gauging the impact of NOLs on pricing in M&A activity. 
Two samples (NOP and NOL) are used by Moore and Pruitt (1987). The NOP 
sample is the profit firm sample which consists of randomly selected firms of one-fifth of 
all firms listed in Compustat without reporting NOLs in 1975. Also, firms with 1975 
NOLs smaller in magnitude than their seven-year expected earnings are included in NOP. 
The NOL sample contains all firms in Compustat whose NOLs in 1975 are larger in 
magnitude than their seven-year earnings expectations. Subsequently, the cumulative 
standardized portfolio performance differentials between the NOP and NOL groups 
around the time of passage of the Section 382 revision are measured. 
The results show that the NOP portfolio significantly outperforms the NOL 
portfolio over the pre-event interval (101 days), but there is no significant difference over 
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the post-event interval (50 days). Based on these results, Moore and Pruitt note that 
NOLs are priced by the market, and because of the probability of expiration, the Section 
382 revision reduces the present value of the loss firms' NOLs. Accordingly, they 
suggest that tax motivated mergers may be more of a myth than reality, and the 
substantial acquisition premiums over pre-offer prices observed by target firms at the 
time of merger announcements are not the result of tax considerations (p. 160). 
Haw et al. Haw et al. (1987) argue that, because of the availability of tax 
benefits in M&A, troubled firms with tax loss carryforwards could receive larger 
acquisition premiums than those troubled firms without tax loss carryforwards. Further, 
due to the visibility of the tax loss carryforwards, they expect that troubled firms with tax 
loss carryforwards would experience earlier increases in market values compared with 
troubled firms without tax loss carryforwards. 
Using the Airman Z score as an indicator of financial stress, Haw et al. recognize 
some of their sample firms as troubled firms, which are separated into groups with and 
without tax loss carryforwards. Meanwhile, the acquisition premiums are calculated as 
the cumulative average returns (CARs) which are the average of the aggregate weekly 
abnormal returns for the period beginning the sixty weeks before and ending the three 
weeks after the acquisition announcement. Their results indicate that troubled firms with 
tax loss carryforwards had a 33.7 percent acquisition premium while the acquisition 
premium for those without tax loss carryforwards was only 19.6 percent. 
Additionally, Haw et al. relate CARs to four firm-specific variables: tax loss 
carryforwards magnitude (defined as the ratio of available tax loss carryforwards to total 
revenues), leverage, size, and ownership concentration. CARs are calculated over four 
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testing periods: 1) the entire testing period, weeks -60 to +3; 2) an early recovery period, 
weeks -40 to -11; 3) the second recovery period: weeks -30 to -11; and 4) the period 
surrounding the acquisition announcement, week -6 to +1. They find that the magnitude 
of the tax loss carryforwards is positively associated with the size of the acquisition 
premium over the recovery periods. These results confirm their expectation that troubled 
firms with tax loss carryforwards, relative to those without tax loss carryforwards, 
experience early market value recovery. 
Hayn. Hayn (1989) assesses the importance of target firms' two tax attributes -
NOL carryforwards and unused (investment and foreign) tax credits - in motivating 
acquisitions. She argues that because of the difficulty of anticipating the tax status of an 
acquisition, the potential benefits of these tax attributes are not fully included in the 
participating firms' stock prices prior to the merger announcement. Therefore, it is 
expected that the NOL carryforwards and unused tax credits are positively correlated 
with the announcement-period returns of the involved firms. Specifically, the magnitude 
of the announcement-period returns should be positively related to the portion of the 
NOL carryforwards and unused tax credits that are expiring within a short period of time. 
In her model, Hayn relates the announcement-period returns to the tax attributes 
and several nontax control variables in a cross-sectional regression. The combined 
amount of the NOL carryforwards and unused tax credits is divided into two components: 
short-lived (expiring within two years) and long-lived. The control variables include the 
ratio between the sizes of the target and the acquirer, type of acquisition offer, single or 
multiple active bidders, resistance to an acquisition, and financial performance of the 
target. 
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The results show that in nontaxable acquisitions the long-lived NOL 
carryforwards and unused tax credits are positively related to the announcement-period 
returns, as expected, but not significant. Nevertheless, the short-lived portion of NOL 
carryforwards and unused tax credits is positive and significant at the 0.05 level. 
Accordingly, Hayn suggests that the amount of NOL carryforwards and unused tax 
credits due to expire is the most prominent tax attribute in nontaxable acquisitions. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient of the short-lived NOL carryforwards and unused tax credits 
in taxable acquisitions is negative and significant at the 0.10 level. She interprets the 
findings as that the market has partially priced the value of these tax carryforwards and 
credits before the acquisition announcement and decreased the stock price after realizing 
that these tax attributes will never be used in a taxable acquisition. 
Plummer and Robinson. Plummer and Robinson (1990) examine the 
relation between the target firms' tax carryforwards and the excess stock returns when a 
pending acquisition is announced (the announcement effect). Concerned with the 
conflicting results shown in prior studies, they use a matched-pair design to control for 
non-tax variables associated with acquisition returns. That is, the sample target firms with 
and without tax carryforwards are matched in light of the four characteristics: industry 
classification, year of acquisition, asset size, and profitability. In addition, to control for 
the market anticipation effect, Plummer and Robinson estimate the excess returns for 
periods up to 300 trading days prior to the announcement date. 
The results show that while tax carryforwards are associated with higher excess 
returns instantaneously surrounding the announcement, the difference is not statistically 
significant. They explain this lack of statistical significance as the result of the increased 
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market anticipation on the prospective acquisition for firms with tax carryforwards. 
Nevertheless, the subsequent test for market anticipation provides no evidence of an 
earlier increase in returns for firms with tax carryforwards. Accordingly, they suggest that 
the lack of evidence supporting either the announcement effect or the anticipation effect 
indicates that the value of tax carryforwards does not increase with the acquisition 
announcement. As a result, they are suspect of the necessity for imposing limitations on 
the use of tax carryforwards. 
Acquisition Premium 
Crawford and Lechner. While Haw et al. (1987) and Hayn (1989) claim 
that a target's valuable attributes result in higher acquisition premiums, Crawford and 
Lechner (1996) argue that the target's attributes affect both the value of the target and the 
probability that it will be acquired. When an acquisition is anticipated, the anticipation 
effect is already reflected in the price of the target's stock. Therefore, as anticipation 
increases, the market's response on the announcement date decreases. 
In their study, the price offered by the acquiring firm is decomposed into three 
components: the value of the target if no acquisition occurs, the anticipated portion of the 
acquisition premium that investors can estimate, and the remaining unanticipated portion 
of the acquisition premium that is paid to target shareholders. They assert that prior 
research (e.g., Haw et al., 1987; Hayn, 1989) only measures the surprise portion of the 
price premium. Instead, they define the acquisition premium as the target's cumulative 
market model residuals from 50 days before the announcement to the date the target was 
delisted. This definition considers the value-weighted market portfolio as a benchmark so 
the calculation can catch both the anticipated and surprise portions of the price premium. 
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Crawford and Lechner use a Probit model to rank the sample target firms in terms 
of their estimated probability of acquisition, which is a function of three tax variables -
the potential increase in the tax basis of the target's assets, NOL carryforwards, and tax 
credit carryforwards - and three financial variables - return on equity, leverage, and 
liquidity. They find that the price premiums and the probabilities of acquisition are 
negatively associated. Subsequently, a multivariate regression is employed to test the 
relation between price premiums and the six explanatory variables. The results show that 
leverage, liquidity, and the potential step-up of the target's assets are significantly related 
to the acquisition premiums. In other words, NOL and tax credit carryforwards are not 
relevant to acquisition premiums. 
Ayers et aL Ayers et al. (2003) examine whether shareholder-level capital gains 
taxes are associated with higher acquisition premiums for taxable acquisitions. They 
model acquisition premiums as a function of proxies for the capital gains taxes of target 
shareholders, taxability of the acquisition, and tax status of the price-setting shareholder 
as represented by the level of target institutional ownership. Several explanatory variables 
representing characteristics of the acquired firm and the acquisition transactions (e.g., tax 
carryforwards of the target firms) are incorporated in the model as control variables. 
Their results show that acquisition premiums are associated with shareholder's capital 
gains tax, type of acquisition, management hostility, competing bids, tender offers, tax 
carryforwards, the target firm's leverage, book-to-market ratio, return on market value of 
equity, and the bidder's pre-announcement ownership in the target firm. 
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Summary of Research on Effects 
of Deferred Taxes in M&A 
Auerbach and Reishus (1988a, 1988b, and 1998c) estimate the tax benefits 
associated with tax loss and credit carryforwards in M&A and suggest that tax 
motivations do not play an important role in merger decisions. Meanwhile, prior research 
employing event studies in the M&A context confirms that the market reacts positively to 
tax carryforwards. However, these studies do not focus on how the acquirers evaluate 
these tax benefits. Also, the price valuation model which is popularly employed in non-
M&A situations is not applied. Therefore, a study that uses price valuation models to 
explore the evaluation by acquirers on target firms' tax carryforwards benefit can 
augment this research stream. 
CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
This study extends the value relevance research of deferred taxes to the M&A 
arena. Specifically, price valuation models (e.g., Feltham and Ohlson, 1995) are applied 
to examine the effect of target firms' tax attributes on acquisition prices. Price valuation 
models have been used to ascertain the value relevant content of deferred tax information 
in non-M&A activity (e.g., Amir et al., 1997; Amir and Sougiannis, 1999; Zeng, 2003). 
However, these models have not been used in the M&A context to examine the value 
relevance of deferred taxes. Therefore, this paper extends the methodological application 
of the Feltham-Ohlson model. 
Research Questions 
As discussed in chapter 1, this study focuses on the following research questions 
to shed light on the value relevance of deferred taxes in M&A. 
1. Are target firms' deferred tax assets (liabilities) priced as assets (liabilities) in 
M&A? 
2. Are target firms' valuation allowance accounts priced in M&A? 
3. Are target firms' deferred tax assets from NOL and tax credit carryforwards 




The preceding research questions are examined by testing the following 
hypotheses, which are written in alternative forms. 
Hia: Deferred tax assets (liabilities) of target firms are priced as assets (liabilities) in 
M&A. 
H2a: Target firms' valuation allowance accounts are priced in M&A. 
H3a: Target firms' NOL and tax credit carryforwards are priced in M&A. 
Research Methods 
Event studies have been employed in prior research (Moore and Pruitt, 1987; Haw 
et al., 1987; Hayn, 1989; Plummer and Robinson, 1990) to investigate the value 
relevance of tax carryforwards in the M&A context. Most of these studies suggest the 
market does give value to tax carryforwards in connection to the potential tax benefits in 
M&A. However, Plummer and Robinson (1990) point out that the anticipation effect of 
the market in an earlier period can weaken the significance level of the research results. 
Meanwhile, although the market's (i.e., the investors') viewpoint of evaluating tax 
carryforwards in M&A is well documented, participating firms' perspectives on these 
carryforwards have not yet been studied.20 As an alternative to an event study, price 
valuation models can avoid the anticipation effect and reveal how the participating firms 
price a target firm's tax attributes. 
An acquisition transaction should be officially approved by the shareholders of the acquired and 
acquiring firms (Bruner, 2004, p. 685). Essentially, the acquisition price implies the shareholders' 
perspectives on the value of the target. However, the top management of the participating firms usually 
initiates the acquisition price and negotiates with each other. Therefore, this price is primarily based on 
the perspective of participating firms' management instead of their shareholders. 
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Under the assumption of clean surplus accounting, Feltham and Ohlson (1995) 
present a price valuation model in which the market value of equity is equal to the sum of 
the book value of shareholders' equity and the present value of expected future abnormal 
earnings. Feltham and Ohlson argue that the present value of expected future abnormal 
earnings is a function of current abnormal earnings, the current book value of operating 
assets, and other relevant information. Amir et al. (1997) extend the Feltham and Ohlson 
model in order to examine the value relevance of deferred taxes by adding net deferred 
taxes to the model. Consistent with these studies, the current paper relates the market 
value of equity (P) to net deferred taxes (DT), net operating assets (OA), net financial 
assets (FA), and current abnormal earnings (AE). 
P = <x0 + aiDT + a2OA + a3FA + a4AE + co (1) 
In M&A, it is common for an acquirer to pay a target firm acquisition premiums, 
which is the portion of the payment over the premerger market value of the target's 
equity. That is, acquisition price (AP) equals the premerger market value of equity plus 
acquisition premiums (PREM). Substituting the market value of equity from equation (1), 
acquisition price can be written as follows: 
AP = a0 + aiDT + a2OA + a3FA + a4AE + a5PREM + y (2) 
Determinants of merger premiums have been empirically assessed. Specifically, 
Ayers et al. (2003) find that acquisition premiums are associated with transactional 
factors such as taxability of acquisition (TRAN), the bidder's pre-announcement 
ownership in the target (BOWN), management hostility (HOST), competing bids (CB), 
and tender offers (TEN), as well as the target firm's characteristics, such as leverage 
(LEV), return on market value of equity (ROE), and ratio of book value of equity to 
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market value of equity (BKMV). Furthermore, because target firms' NOL and tax credit 
carryforwards cannot be transferred to acquirers under Type B, divisive Type D, and 
Type E reorganizations, an indicator variable BDE is included in the model to control this 
factor. Therefore, equation (2) can be extended as follows: 
AP = a0 + cnDT + a2OA + a3FA + a4AE + a5TRAN + a6BDE 
+a7BOWN + a8HOST + a9CB + ai0TEN + anLEV 
+ (X12ROE + ai3BKMV + a (3) 
Indicator variables for target firm industry and year of acquisition are added to the 
model to control the possibility that acquisition prices may vary among industries and 
over time. 
Firms in different industries may face diversities in fundamental economic factors 
such as maturity, technological change, capital expenditures, and innovation intensity. To 
control these economic fundamentals, sample firms are usually grouped by industry. The 
underlying assumption is that the market evaluates firms in a given industry in a similar 
manner (Landry, 1998). In non-M&A, the prior research on whether the industry effect 
exists shows mixed results. That is, Amir et al. (1997) divide sample firms into six 
industrial groups but do not find differences among these groups. However, Landry (1998) 
reveals that the value relevance of deferred taxes is different among drug, automotive, 
and computer industries. In the M&A context, Ayers et al. (2003) find that target firms in 
SIC 1000 (metal and mining), SIC 2000 (food, textile, and chemicals), and SIC 4000 
(transportation and utilities) received significantly lower acquisition premiums than firms 
in other SIC segments. 
21
 Target's NOL carryforwards are significant in Ayers et al. (2003). Since research question 3 mainly 
focuses on this variable, it is not included in the base model. 
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Following the sample grouping in Ayers et al. (2003), the present study assigns 
firms with the same one-digit SIC into groups and incorporates indicator variables SIC, in 
the model. Also, indicator variables YEAR7 represent the year when the acquisition is 
announced. A two-way fixed effect model is used to control the industry and year effects. 
AP = p0 + piDT + p2OA + p3FA + p4AE + p5TRAN + p6BDE 
+ p7BOWN + p8HOST + p9CB + P10TEN + PnLEV 
+ p12ROE + p13BKMV+ Ep14,SIQ + SPi5/YEAR7 + s (4) 
Equation (4) serves as a base model in the present study. Additional independent 
variables are incorporated to test the research hypotheses. For detailed variable 
definitions, see Table 3.1. Further discussions of the variables are provided later in this 
chapter. 
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Table 3.1 Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variable 
AP Acquisition price represents the implied value of a transaction calculated by 
multiplying the number of common shares outstanding by the offering price, 
deflated by the number of target's common stock outstanding in the last annual 
report prior to the announcement date. 
Independent Variables 
DT Net deferred taxes, which are the net amount of target's deferred tax assets minus 
deferred tax liability, deflated by the number of target's common stock 
outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
OA Net operating assets of the target, deflated by the number of target's common stock 
outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
FA Net financial assets of the target, deflated by the number of target's common stock 
outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
AE Current abnormal earnings, which are the current earnings in the year before the 
announcement year minus expected normal earnings (net operating assets at the 
beginning of the year before the announcement year times cost of capital), 
deflated by the number of target's common stock outstanding in the last annual 
report prior to the announcement date. Proxies for cost of capital are obtained 
from Ibbotson (2008). 
TPvAN Taxability of acquisition: an indicator variable which equals one for a non-taxable 
acquisition, otherwise zero. 
BDE Indicator variable which equals one if the acquisition is classified as Type B, 
divisive Type D, or Type E reorganization, otherwise zero. 
BOWN A continuous variable, which is ranged between 0 and 1, represents the percentage 
of target's common stock owned by the acquirer prior to the announcement date. 
HOST Management hostility: an indicator variable, which equals one if the target's 
management opposed the acquisition, otherwise zero. 
CB Competing bids: an indicator variable, which equals one if a competing bidder 
existed, otherwise zero. 
TEN Tender offer: an indicator variable, which equals one if the acquisition was 
initiated with a tender offer, otherwise zero. 
LEV Target's leverage, which is the ratio of long-term debt to the target's market value 
4 weeks prior to the announcement date. 
ROE Return on market value of equity, which is the ratio of the target's net income 
before extraordinary items to the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement date. 
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Table 3.1 Variable Definitions (Continued) 
Variable Definition 
Independent Variables 
BKMV Ratio of target's book value of equity to market value of equity, which is the 
target's book value of equity in the last annual report prior to the announcement 
date, divided by the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement 
date. 
GDTA Gross deferred tax assets, which are the target's deferred tax assets before being 
reduced by the valuation allowance, deflated by the number of target's common 
stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
NDTA Net deferred tax assets, which are the target's deferred tax assets netted after the 
valuation allowance, deflated by the number of target's common stock 
outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
DTL Deferred tax liabilities of the target, deflated by the number of target's common 
stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
VA Valuation allowance of the target, deflated by the number of target's common stock 
outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
NOL Deferred tax assets from the target's NOL carryforwards, deflated by the number of 
target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the 
announcement date. 
OLC Deferred tax assets from the target's other loss carryforwards, deflated by the 
number of target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to 
the announcement date. 
TCC Deferred tax assets from the target's tax credit carryforwards, deflated by the 
number of target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to 
the announcement date. 
AODTA All other deferred tax assets of the target, deflated by the number of target's 
common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement 
date. 
SIC,- Target firm's one-digit SIC classifications: indicator variables. 
YEAR, Indicator variable which is equal to one when the acquisition announcement is in 
year/, otherwise zero.y = 1998, 1999, ...2006. 
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Research Question 1 
Deferred taxes are recorded as assets and/or liabilities on the balance sheet. Past 
research has shown that investors may treat deferred tax assets (liabilities) and adjust 
them in several ways: 1) as real assets (liabilities), 2) deduct (add) deferred tax assets 
(liabilities) from (to) equity, or 3) simply ignore them (Landry, 1998). Prior research 
indicates that in general the market views deferred assets (liabilities) as real assets 
(liabilities) in non-M&A settings. Consequently, it is expected that participating firms 
will consider the targets' deferred assets (liabilities) in setting acquisition prices. 
A tax variable included in the base model is net deferred taxes (DT) which 
represents an aggregated number of deferred tax assets (netted after valuation allowance) 
and deferred tax liabilities. However, aggregated information can lose some of its original 
contents. Accordingly, net deferred taxes are decomposed into deferred tax assets netted 
after valuation allowance (NDTA) and deferred tax liabilities (DTL). 
Numeric examples in Table 3.2 show the underlying mechanism between the 
acquisition price and target firms' deferred tax assets (liabilities).22 In non-taxable 
acquisitions, a target firm with deferred tax assets (Scenario Bl) provides more net 
present value to the acquirer than a target firm without deferred tax assets/liabilities 
(Scenario Al). In contrast, a target firm with deferred tax liabilities (Scenario CI) 
provides less net present value to the acquirer that a target firm without deferred tax 
assets/liabilities (Scenario Al). Furthermore, in the taxable acquisitions A2, B2, and C2, 
the net present values provided by the target firm to the acquirer are the same in the three 
scenarios. However, the target firm with deferred tax assets (Scenario B2) and the target 
For detailed information regarding these numeric examples, see Appendix. 
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firm with deferred tax liabilities (Scenario C2) receive the highest and lowest net 
amounts from the acquirers, respectively. Therefore, in a non-taxable acquisition, 
acquiring firms should be willing to pay higher acquisition prices for target firms with 
deferred tax assets, but lower acquisition prices for target firms with deferred tax 
liabilities. To examine the relationship between taxability of acquisition and deferred tax 
assets/liabilities, interactions NDTA*TRAN and DTL*TRAN are included in the model. 
Therefore, the model used to test hypothesis one is as follows. 
AP = p0 + XiNDTA + k2NDTA*TRAN + X3DTL + LdDTLTRAN 
+ p2OA + p3FA + p4AE + p5TRAN + p6BDE 
+ p7BOWN + p8HOST + p9CB + P10TEN + PnLEV 
+ P12ROE + P13BKMV+ Spi4lSIQ + Spis/YEAR, + % (5) 
Table 3.2 Mechanism between the Acquisition Price and Target's Deferred Taxes 
The potential target firms have the following basic financial information. 
Market Value Book Value Tax Basis of Deferred Tax Deferred Tax 
ofAssets* of Assets Assets Assets* Liabilities* 
Target A 211,336 100,000 100,000 
Target B 211,336 100,000 100,000 20,000 
Target C 211,336 100,000 50,000 17,500 
'Effects of deferred taxes are not included. 
* Deferred tax assets and liabilities are not included in the book value of assets. 
For the following scenarios, assume discount rate = 10%, corporate income tax rate = 35%, and capital gains tax Rate = 
20%. Target firms A, B, and C are predicted to have net pretax cash flows of $75,000 for the next five years and 
assume their residual values are zero. Assume target firms' assets are fully depreciated by the acquirers in five years 
with a straight-line method. 
Scenario 
Net present value to the 
acquirer 
Amount paid to the target 
Net amount received by 
the target 




































Note: For detailed information regarding these numeric examples, see Appendix. 
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Because of the expectation that acquirers cannot utilize a target firms' deferred 
tax assets (liabilities) in taxable acquisitions, the coefficients of NDTA and DTL (i.e., Xi 
and ^3) are expected to be zero. Since acquirers are willing to pay higher (lower) 
acquisition prices for target firms with deferred tax assets (liabilities) in a non-taxable 
acquisition, hi QH) is expected to be positive (negative). 
Research Question 2 
SFAS No. 109 requires that a valuation allowance be recognized for deferred tax 
assets if there is a likelihood of more than 50 percent that some, or all, of the deferred tax 
assets will not be realized. Therefore, a valuation allowance may represent managers' 
perspectives on the expectation of future profitability (Bauman and Das, 2004). In non-
M&A, Amir et al. (1997) and Ayers (1998) indicate that valuation allowances are 
negatively associated with firm value. Also, Amir et al. (1997) argue that the coefficients 
on the valuation allowances should be interpreted together with the coefficient on tax 
carryforwards. Nevertheless, they find it difficult to interpret the coefficients on the 
valuation allowances because the market does not assign a value to the tax carryforwards. 
Consistent with prior research in non-M&A, this study creates gross deferred tax 
assets (GDTA) by adding valuation allowances (VA) back to deferred tax assets netted 
after valuation allowances. Similar to Model 5, interactions GDTA*TRAN and 
VA*TRAN are incorporated. Consequently, the following model is employed to test 
hypothesis two: 
All deferred tax assets and liabilities are coded as positive numbers. 
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AP = p0 + (piGDTA + cp2GDTA*TRAN + q>3VA + cp4VA*TRAN 
+ ?i3DTL + ?MDTL*TRAN + p2OA + p3FA + p4AE 
+ p5TRAN + p6BDE + p7BOWN + p8HOST + p9CB + PioTEN 
+ pnLEV + P12ROE + p13BKMV+ SpHiSIQ + EPis/YEAR, + r) (6) 
Since acquirers succeed target firms' tax attributes only in non-taxable 
acquisitions, cp4 is expected to be negative but (p2 is positive. Conversely, in taxable 
acquisitions, acquirers cannot utilize target firms' tax attributes. Therefore, the 
coefficients on valuation allowance (i.e., <p3) and gross deferred tax assets (i.e., (pi) are 
expected to be zero. 
Research Question 3 
Prior research shows mixed results on whether the market assigns a value to a 
firm's NOL and tax credit carryforwards. In non-M&A, Givoly and Hayn (1991) indicate 
that stock price is related to a firm's NOL and tax credit carryforwards, but Ayers (1998) 
provides evidence that loss and tax carryforwards are not priced by the market. Zeng 
(2003) suggests that NOL carryforwards, but not investment tax credit carryforwards, 
increase firm market value. In the M&A context, Moore and Pruitt (1987) find there is a 
positive relationship between a firm's NOL carryforwards and stock price. Also, Ayers et 
al. (2003) show acquisition premiums are associated with a target firm's NOL 
carryforwards. However, Moore and Pruitt (1987) do not confirm a significant 
association. 
In accordance with prior research, the present study decomposes gross deferred 
tax assets into several components: NOL carryforwards (NOL), other loss carryforwards 
(OLC), tax credit carryforwards (TCC), and all other deferred tax assets (AODTA). Also, 
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interactions NOLTRAN, OLC*TRAN, TCC*TRAN, and AODTA*TRAN are 
incorporated in the model. Accordingly, the model used to test the third hypothesis is as 
follows. 
AP = p0 + piNOL + p2NOL*TRAN + p3OLC + p4OLC*TRAN 
+ p5TCC + p6TCC*TRAN + p7AODTA + p8AODTA*TRAN 
+ (p3 VA + cp4VA*TRAN + X3DTL + ^DTLTRAN + p2OA 
+ p3FA + p4AE + p5TRAN + p6BDE + p7BOWN + pgHOST 
+ p9CB + pioTEN + PnLEV + Pi2ROE + P13BKMV+ 
+ 2Pi4iSIQ + Epis/YEAR, + 5 (7) 
The current study focuses on whether these tax carryforwards can provide tax 
benefits to the acquiring firms such that the acquirers are willing to pay for these 
carryforwards. Since target firms' tax attributes may provide potential tax benefits to 
acquirers only in non-taxable acquisitions, the coefficients of p2> p4, P6, and p% are 
expected to be positive. Conversely, since acquirers cannot succeed target firms' tax 
attributes in taxable acquisitions, pi, P3, ps, and p7 are expected to be zero. For a summary 
of expected signs of coefficients and variables included in models, see Table 3.3. 






































































































































































































The frame of the research sample consists of firms listed in the Securities Data 
Corporation's M&A database (the SDC database) and acquired during 1997-2006. 
Variable STATC in the SDC database for these firms must show "Completed" and the 
targets are wholly owned by the acquiring firms after the acquisitions (PCTOWN="100"). 
These firms should also meet all of the following requirements in order to be included in 
the final sample. First, before acquisition, the firms were listed on the New York or 
American Stock Exchanges. Second, firms were not classified as financial institutions 
(one-digit SIC code 6) or electric utilities (two-digit SIC code 49).24 Third, firms should 
have desired financial data (e.g., LEV, ROE, and BKMV). Finally, firms' last annual 
financial statements prior to the announcement date shown in the Edgar online database 
disclose needed deferred tax information. 
Variables 
This section includes detailed discussions of the key variables used in this study. 
The continuous dollar variables are all deflated by the number of the target's common 
stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date in order to 
reduce the heteroskedasticity effect. 
Acquisition Price. Acquisition price represents the total value of 
consideration paid to target shareholders. The variable VALIMP (the implied value of a 
transaction) in the SDC database is used as this variable. This price is calculated by 
multiplying the number of common shares outstanding by the offering price. 
24
 This requirement is identical to Amir et al. (1997). 
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Transactional Variables. TRAN is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the acquisition is non-taxable and zero otherwise. Information about TRAN can be 
obtained from the Commerce Clearing House ("CCH") Capital Changes Reporter 
that covers federal taxation consequences of corporate capital changes resulting from 
stock dividends, stock splits, reorganizations, exchanges, rights, and other changes in 
capital structure. 
Variable BDE is an indicator variable that equals one if the acquisition is 
classified as Type B, divisive Type D, or Type E reorganization and zero otherwise. 
Variables CONSID_STRUCTURE, SPIN, SPLIT, and RECAP in the SDC database are 
used to decide the value of BDE. That is, if CONSIDSTRUCTURE equals "Stock only" 
or SPIN, SPLIT, or RECAP equal "Yes," BDE is equal to one, otherwise zero. 
Transactional variable BOWN is continuous, but HOST, CB, and TEN are 
indicator variables. Information needed for these variables are derived from the SDC 
database. Specifically, PCTACQ (percentage of shares acquired), ATTC (attitude code of 
the transaction), CHA (challenging bid flag), and TEND (tender offer flag) in the SDC 
database are respectively used for the transactional variables. PCTACQ represents the 
percentage of shares acquired in the transaction. Accordingly, BOWN equals to 100 
minus PCTACQ. If ATTC equals "Hostile," HOST is equal to one and zero otherwise. 
When CHA is greater than " 1 , " CB equals one and zero, otherwise. When TEND equals 
"Yes," TEN is equal to one and zero, otherwise. 
Target's Financial Variables. Variables related to a target's financial status, 
OA, FA, AE, LEV, ROE, and BKMV, are taken from the target's last annual report 
before the announcement date. The calculations for OA, FA, and AE follow Amir et al. 
53 
(1997). That is, net operating assets are figured as book value of shareholders' equity 
minus net deferred taxes (i.e., net deferred tax assets minus deferred tax liabilities) and 
net financial assets. Net financial assets are computed as cash and cash equivalents plus 
short-term investments, minus long-term debt, current portion of long-term debt, and 
preferred stock. All assets and liabilities are coded as positive so that the coefficients of 
independent variables present the associated direction with acquisition price. Current 
earnings are calculated as income before extraordinary items plus tax-adjusted interest 
expense minus tax-adjusted other nonoperating income. All tax-adjusted items are 
calculated by using the original amounts multiplied by one minus the maximum federal 
corporate income tax rate effective in the year prior to the announcement year. 
Therefore, current abnormal earnings are computed as current earnings minus expected 
normal earnings (net operating assets at the beginning of the year before the 
announcement year times cost of capital). Similar to prior research (e.g., Givoly and 
Hayn, 1991; Landry, 1998; Amir and Sougiannis, 1999), proxies for the cost of capital 
are obtained from the Ibbotson Yearbook. The current study uses Ibbotson (2008, p. 44). 
Deferred Tax Variables. Data for deferred tax variables (i.e., DT, GDTA, 
NDTA, DTL, VA, NOL, OLC, TCC, and AODTA) are collected from the target's last 
annual report prior to the announcement date. FISCAL in the SDC database is used to 
identify the date of last fiscal year end prior to the announcement date. All of the values of 
these deferred tax variables are recorded positively in the current study such that the 
corresponding coefficients in the models can easily indicate the directions between the 
acquisition price and these variables. Notwithstanding that VA is a contra account of 
25
 The maximum federal corporate income tax rate between 1997 and 2006 persisted at 35 percent. 
Therefore, the multiplier of the tax-adjusted items is 0.65 for all observations. 
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GDTA, the amount of VA is recorded as a positive number. Likewise, the dollar amount 
of the liability in DTL is recorded as a positive number such that the expected correlation 
with prices is negative. 
NOL, OLC, TCC, and AODTA are proxies as tax benefits of the carryforwards to 
the acquirer at the announcement date. These variables are disclosed in tax footnotes as 
future tax savings (SFAS No. 109, par 43). 
SIC,-. Based on one-digit SIC code, sample firms are grouped by industry. 
Targets' SIC codes are obtained from Research Insight. See Table 3.4 for detailed 
grouping information. 
Table 3.4 Industrial Groups and Indicator Variables 
One-Digit SIC Code Industry Indicator Variable 
SIC 0000 Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 
SIC 1000 Metal and mining 
SIC 2000 Food, textile, and chemicals SIC; 
SIC 3000 Rubber, metal, and machines SIC? 
SIC 4000 Transportation SIC3 
SIC 5000 Wholesale and retail trade SIQ 
SIC 7000 Hotel and other services SIC5 
SIC 8000 Health and engineering services SICg 
Summary 
Price valuation models have been applied to examine the value relevance of 
deferred taxes in non-M&A. In contrast, event study methodology is dominant in M&A. 
However, price valuation models can provide two advantages to the value relevance of 
deferred taxes research in the M&A context. First, price valuation models can avoid the 
drawback of the anticipation effect. Second, the models can reveal participating firms' 
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viewpoints, rather than the market's, on the price of a target's deferred taxes. 
Accordingly, price valuation models are used in this study. 
Chapter 1 addresses four research questions and this chapter develops the models 
by which these questions are investigated. Specifically, the procedure to identify the 
research sample, definitions of variables, and appropriate statistical techniques are 
discussed. Results of this empirical inquiry are presented in Chapter 4. 
CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
Previous chapters contain: (1) a discussion of the important role of deferred taxes 
in M&A settings, (2) a selected literature review related to the valuation of deferred tax 
assets/liabilities, and (3) development of the methodology used in this study. The purpose 
of this chapter is to present the results of the data analysis and tests of the hypotheses. 
Descriptive statistics are shown first, followed by an analysis of each hypothesis 
presented in Chapter 3. 
Summary of Input Data 
Research Insight holds 2,506 inactive firms listed on the New York or American 
Stock Exchanges during 1997-2006. However, only 829 companies comply with the 
status and ownership criteria. After deleting firms without needed data, the final sample 
consists of 690 observations. See Table 4.1 for the sampling scheme. The number of 
firms over the time period covered by this study are presented in Figure 4.1. The year 
2000 contains the largest sample, 121 firms, but during the years following the internet 
bubble burst the numbers dropped dramatically. Figure 4.2 shows the number of firms 
classified by one digit SIC code. The one digit SIC code of 3 (i.e., rubber, metal, and 
machine industries) provides the largest number of firms, 209, while only two firms are 
from the one digit SIC code of 0 (i.e., agriculture, forestry, and fishing industries). Due to 
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the small number of observations from the one digit SIC code of 0, these two firms are 
included in the SIC 1000 group for SIC dummy variable purposes. 26 





Research Insight inactive firms listed on the 
NYSE/ASE during 1997-2006 
No matching firms in SDC database under the 
status and ownership criteria 






No matched firms in EDGAR 
No electronic files in EDGAR 
Partnership 
Limited Liability Companies 
Missing tax information in financial statements 
Missing data on variable VALIMP in SDC 
Missing data on variable MV in SDC 
Missing financial data in Research Insight 











Final Sample 690 
When these two observations are deleted, the results remain unchanged. 
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Figure 4.2 Numbers of Firms by SIC 
Table 4.2 shows the frequencies of indicator variables in this study. Two hundred 
fifty four transactions (36.8 percent) are non-taxable. One hundred thirty two acquisitions 
(19.1 percent) are classified as Type B, divisive Type D, or Type E transactions. Only 
seventeen (2.5 percent) target firms' management is hostile against the acquisition, but 
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most of the transactions (93.3 percent) do not have multiple bidders. Finally, two hundred 
twenty seven acquirers (32.9 percent) provide tender offer to the targets. 
Table 4.2 Frequencies of Indicator Variables 
Variable Where the indicator variable is 
0 1 
TRAN 436 (63.2%) 254 (36.8%) 
BDE 558 (80.9%) 132 (19.1%) 
HOST 673 (97.5%) 17 (2.5%) 
CB 644 (93.3%) 46 (6.7%) 
TEN 463 (67.1%) 227 (32.9%) 
TRAN: 0 Taxable transaction; 1 Non-Taxable transaction. 
BDE: 0 Non-Type B, divisive Type D, or Type E transaction; 1 Type B, divisive Type D, or Type E 
transaction. 
HOST: 0 Management-friendly transaction; 1 Management-hostile transaction. 
CB: 0 Single bidder; 1 Multiple bidders. 
TEN: 0 Non-tender offer; 1 Tender offer. 
Panel A in Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics of financial variables. AP, 
OA, FA, and AE are stated in dollars per share. The average (median) acquisition price is 
$32.56 ($27.32). The mean (median) net operating assets of the target is $16.45 ($12.88), 
while the mean (median) net financial assets of the target is -$6.15 (-$4.16). The negative 
sign of FA indicates that most of the target firms have debt in excess of cash, cash 
equivalent, and short-term investments. The mean (median) current abnormal earnings is 
-$1.38 (-$0.83), indicating that most of the target firms have lower current earnings than 
expected. The target's mean (median) leverage is $0.63 ($0.26) and return on market 
value of equity is close to zero (mean (median) = -$0.03 ($0.05)). However, the negative 
mean of ROE shows that its distribution is skewed to the left. These numbers indicate 
that the target firms do not make large profits, in general. Finally, the median market 
value of equity (MV) is around twice that of the book value of equity (BK). 
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difference = Mean of taxable acquisitions - mean of non-taxable acquisitions. 
Notes: 
Sample consists of 690firms listed on New York or American Stock Exchanges and acquired during 1997-2006. 
Acquisition price (AP) represents the implied value of a transaction calculated by multiplying the number of common shares outstanding by the 
offering price, deflated by the number of target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. OA 
represents the net operating assets of the target, deflated by the number of target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report 
prior to the announcement date. Net operating assets are figured as book value of shareholders' equity plus net deferred tax liabilities 
minus net financial assets. FA represents the net financial assets of the target, deflated by the number of target's common stock 
outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. Net financial assets are computed as cash and cash equivalents plus 
short-term investments, minus long-term debt, current portion of long-term debt, and preferred stock Current abnormal earnings (AE), 
which are the current earnings in the year before the announcement year minus expected normal earnings (net operating assets at the 
beginning of the year before the announcement year times cost of capital), deflated by the number of target's common stock outstanding in 
the last annual report prior to the announcement date. Current earnings are calculated as income before extraordinary items plus tax-
adjusted interest expense minus tax-adjusted other nonoperating income. Target's leverage (LEV) is the ratio of long-term debt to the 
target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. Return on market value of equity (ROE) is the ratio of the target's net 
income before extraordinary items to the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. Ratio of target's book value of 
equity to market value of equity (BKMV) is the target's book value of equity in the last annual report prior to the announcement date, 
divided by the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. BK is the target's book value of equity in the last annual 
report prior to the announcement date. MV is the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. 
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Panels B and C in Table 4.3 present the descriptive statistics of the financial 
variables in taxable and non-taxable acquisitions, respectively. In non-taxable 
transactions, target firms receive a mean acquisition price of $38.94, which is $10.10 (35 
percent) higher than the amount received by the targets in taxable transactions. Target 
firms are paid a mean acquisition premium of $11.49 in non-taxable acquisitions, while 
the mean acquisition premium is only $9.80 in taxable acquisitions. However, in terms of 
percentage, target firms receive a mean acquisition premium equal to 51.47 percent of 
their market value of equity in taxable acquisitions, whereas the mean acquisition 
premium is 41.85 percent of the targets' market value of equity in non-taxable 
acquisitions.27 
Panel D in Table 4.3 shows the mean difference of the financial variables between 
taxable and non-taxable acquisitions. Target firms acquired in non-taxable transactions 
have significantly higher market value and receive higher acquisition price than target 
firms acquired in taxable transactions. However, target firms acquired in taxable 
transactions have significantly higher leverage than target firms acquired in non-taxable 
transactions. 
The descriptive statistics of deferred tax-related variables such as DT, NDTA, 
DTL, GDTA, VA, NOL, OLC, TCC, and AODTA are presented in Table 4.4. All 
numbers are stated in dollars per share. The average deferred tax is -$0.27, indicating that 
target firms have more net deferred tax liabilities than net deferred tax assets. This 
7
 This result is contradicted to the expectation that target firms should receive higher acquisition premiums 
in non-taxable acquisitions. However, two reasons may explain this contradiction. First, target's mean 
deferred taxes are negative, indicating that target's deferred tax liabilities exceed deferred tax assets. Also, 
Table 4.4 shows targets in non-taxable acquisitions have more deferred tax liabilities than targets in 
taxable acquisitions. Net deferred tax liabilities decrease the value of the target. Second, the negotiation 
effect as discussed later may give target firms higher acquisition premiums in taxable acquisitions, which 
in general is the type of transactions the acquirers in this study prefer. 
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interpretation is confirmed by the fact that net deferred tax assets have a mean of $1.36 
while net deferred tax liabilities are $1.63 on average. However, the average gross 
deferred tax assets are $1.90, which is $0.27 larger than the average net deferred tax 
liabilities. The reduction of deferred tax assets is caused by the valuation allowance that 
has an average of $0.54. Deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards have a mean of 
$0.56 which is only $0.02 larger than the average valuation allowance. Average deferred 
tax assets from other loss carryforwards and tax credit carryforwards are $0.04 and $0.11, 
respectively. Compared with these two items, deferred tax assets from all other areas 
have a much larger mean of $1.18. Deferred tax assets from all others consists of the 
largest share (62.1 percent) of gross deferred tax assets and deferred tax assets from NOL 
carryforwards have the second largest portion (29.5 percent). 
Panel D in Table 4.4 presents the mean differences of the tax related variables 
between taxable and non-taxable acquisitions. None of the mean differences are 
significant at the 0.05 level. That is, target firms acquired in taxable acquisitions have the 
means of these tax related variables similar to that of the target firms acquired in non-
taxable acquisitions. 
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Table 4.5 presents the major items aggregated in deferred taxes. Most of the items 
are combined into deferred tax liabilities (DTL) and deferred tax assets from all others 
(AODTA). Several items (e.g., depreciation, pension benefits, and state taxes) have dual 
characteristics, i.e., depending on the circumstances, they can be included in DTL or 
AODTA.28 However, some components (e.g., oil and gas properties, installment sales, 
and prepaid expenses) are only included in DTL and others (e.g., environmental reserves, 
warranty reserves, and contingent litigation payment) are only included in AODTA. 
28
 For example, SFAS No. 158 (FASB, 2006b) requires companies to recognize on their balance sheet the 
full overfunded or underfunded status of their defined benefit pension plan. The overfunded or 
underfunded status is measured as the difference between the fair value of the plan assets and the 
projected benefit obligation. Companies should account for pension costs on the accrual basis (Kieso et 
al., 2007, p. 1025). On the other hand, an employer's contributions to a qualified pension plan are 
generally deductible, but the amount that qualifies for the deduction is limited. Under Code Section 
404(o)(2), the maximum deductible amount is limited to the excess of the sum of the funding target for 
the plan year, the target normal cost for the plan year, and the cushion amount for the plan year, over the 
value (determined under Section 430(g)(2)) of the assets of the plan which are held by the plan as of the 
valuation date for the plan year. Furthermore, under Section 404(o)(3)(A), the cushion amount is the sum 
of 50 percent of the funding target for the plan year and the amount by which the funding target for the 
plan year would increase. Since the accrued pension expense may not equal to the amount actually 
contributed by the company, the contributed amount could be greater or less than the accrued expense. 
When the contributed amount is greater (less) than the accrued pension expense, deferred tax liabilities 
(assets) may be recognized. 
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Table 4.4 Descriptive Statistics of Deferred Tax-Related Variables 
Variable Minim. Maxim. 


































































































































































































































































TDifference = Mean of taxable acquisitions - mean of non-taxable acquisitions. 
Notes: 
Sample consists of 690 firms listed on New York or American Stock Exchanges and acquired duringl997-2006. 
Net deferred taxes (DT) represents the net amount of target's deferred tax assets minus deferred tax liability, deflated by the number 
of target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. Net deferred tax assets (NDTA) 
represents the target's deferred tax assets netted after valuation allowance, deflated by the number of target's common stock 
outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. DTL is the deferred tax liability of the target, deflated by 
the number of target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. Gross deferred tax 
assets (GDTA) represents the target's deferred tax assets before reduced by valuation allowance, deflated by the number of 
target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. VA is the valuation allowance of the 
target, deflated by the number of target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
NOL is the deferred tax assets from the target's NOL carryforwards, deflated by the number of target's common stock 
outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. OLC is the deferred tax assets from the target's other loss 
carryforwards, deflated by the number of target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement 
date. TCC is the deferred tax assets from the target's tax credit carryforwards, deflated by the number of target's common stock 
outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. AODTA is all other deferred tax assets of the target, 
deflated by the number of target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
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Table 4.5 Items Aggregated in Deferred Taxes 
Items that result in deferred tax assets/liabilities 
NOL carryforwards 
Other loss carryforwards (e.g., capital loss carryforwards) 
Alternative minimum tax 
Tax credit carryforwards 
Other tax credit carryforwards (e.g., foreign tax credit) 
Valuation allowance1^ 
Operating leases 
Oil and gas properties 
Goodwill 
Franchise rights 













Equity in joint venture, partnership 
Capitalized interest 
Employee benefits 







Taxes on foreign income 
Deferred income, gains 
State taxes 








Contingent litigation payment 
Unrealized losses 
























































































































Valuation allowance is a contra-asset account. 
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The correlation matrix is shown in Table 4.6, where Pearson (Spearman) 
correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal. Several high correlations exist 
between net operating assets and several other variables. Specifically, the Pearson 
(Spearman) correlation between net operating assets and net financial assets is -0.84 (-
0.73). Also, net operating assets are highly correlated to deferred tax liabilities with a 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation of 0.69 (0.71). Furthermore, the valuation allowance is 
extremely highly correlated with gross deferred tax assets (Pearson (Spearman) = 0.75 
(0.50)) and with deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards (Pearson (Spearman) = 0.82 
(0.59)). The exceptionally high correlation between deferred tax assets from NOL 
carryforwards and the valuation allowance indicates that target firms might not expect 
NOL carryforwards to be fully utilized before expiration and, thereby, recognize a 
valuation allowance. These high correlations may else suggest that a multicollinearity 
issue exists in the models. 
However, Variance Inflation Factor (Kutner et al., 2005) and Condition Index (Belsey, Kuh, and Welsch, 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The base model contains net deferred taxes (DT) to test whether the participating 
firms give value to the targets' deferred taxes. The results are shown in Table 4.7. 
Specifically, column A includes SIC and YEAR dummy variables (the full model), 
whereas column B excludes these dummies (the reduced model). The following F-test is 
used for determination (Kutner et a!., 2005, p. 268). 
SSE(R)-SSE(F) . SSEjF) 
dfR~4fF ' dfF 
With an F-value of 1.3037 (i.e., p-value=0.1936), the full model does not provide 
significant incremental explanatory power as compared to the reduced model. In other 
words, year and industry effects are not significant in this study. Consequently, analyses 
in the current study are based on estimates of the reduced models. 
Results indicate that the effect on net deferred taxes is significantly larger than 
zero at the 0.001 level. Findings show that a dollar value of net deferred taxes is priced 
at $1.34.32 Therefore, the results do confirm that deferred taxes are priced by participating 
firms in M&A. 
'With p-values of 0.2082, 0.2098, and 0.1765, respectively, the full models do not provide significant 
incremental explanatory power as compared to the reduced models in models 5-7. Therefore, only 
reduced model results are reported and discussed in models 5-7. 
If coefficients do not have an expected sign, p-value is two-tailed. However, if sign expected, p-value is 
one-tailed. 
While this estimate is relatively greater than zero, it is not significantly different from one (p-value = 
0.3619). 
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Table 4.7 Value Relevance of Net Deferred Taxes 
Base Model: 
AP=p0 + PiDT + p2OA + p3FA + p4AE + psTRAN + p<fiDE 
+ p7BOWN + PsHOST + p9CB + p10TEN + pnLEV 

























































































































'If coefficients do not have an expected sign, (hep-value is two-tailed. However, if the coefficient has an expected sign, thep-value is one-tailed. 
Notes: 
Sample consists of 690 firms listed on New York or American Stock Exchanges and acquired duringl997-2006. 
Acquisition price (AP) represents the implied value of a transaction calculated by multiplying the number of common shares outstanding by the offering 
price. Net deferred taxes (DT) represents the net amount of the target's deferred tax assets minus deferred tax liability. OA represents the net 
operating assets of the target. Net operating assets are figured as book value of the shareholders' equity plus net deferred tax liabilities minus net 
financial assets. FA represents the net financial assets of the target. Net financial assets are computed as cash and cash equivalents plus short-term 
investments, minus long-term debt, current portion of long-term debt, and preferred stock. Current abnormal earnings (AE), which are the current 
earnings in the year before the announcement year minus expected normal earnings (net operating assets at the beginning of the year before the 
announcement year times cost of capital. Current earnings are calculated as income before extraordinary items plus tax-adjusted interest expense 
minus tax-adjusted other nonoperating income. AP, OA, FA, and AE are deflated by the number of the target's common stock outstanding in the last 
annual report prior to the announcement date. Target's leverage (LEV) is the ratio of long-term debt to the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement date. Return on market value of equity (ROE) is the ratio of the target's net income before extraordinary items to the target's market 
value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. Ratio of the target's book value of equity to market value of equity (BKMV) is the target's book value of 
equity in the last annual report prior to the announcement date, divided by the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. 
Taxability of acquisition (TRAN) is an indicator variable which equals one for a non-taxable acquisition, otherwise zero. BDE is an indicator variable 
which equals one if the acquisition is classified as Type B, divisive Type D, or Type E reorganization, otherwise zero. BOWN, which is ranged between 
0 and 1, represents the percentage of the target's common stock owned by the acquirer prior to the announcement date. Management hostility (HOST) 
is an indicator variable, which equals one if the target's management opposed the acquisition, otherwise zero. Competing bids (CB) is an indicator 
variable, which equals one if a competing bidder existed, otherwise zero. Tender offer (TEN) is an indicator variable, which equals one if the 
acquisition was initiated with a tender offer, otherwise zero. 
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The coefficient on net operating assets, net financial assets, and current abnormal 
earnings are also significantly larger than zero at the 0.001 level. A dollar value of net 
operating assets and net financial assets are priced at $1.73 and $1.39, respectively. These 
two coefficients are significantly different from one (both p-values <0.0001) and the 
coefficient of net operating assets is significantly larger than that of net financial assets 
(p-value <0.0001). The implication is that participating firms expect more returns from 
net operating assets, compared to net financial assets, and give it a higher value. Also, the 
concept of historical costs and conservatism accounting may cause the book value of net 
operating assets to be less than its market value, thereby, driving the coefficient higher 
than one. 
These findings are similar to Amir et al. (1997), which is not related to the M&A 
settings. Nevertheless, this study differs from Amir et al. (1997) in two respects. First, 
Amir et al. (1997) finds net operating assets and net financial assets are priced by the 
market but the marginal value of these assets are significantly less than one. Conversely, 
the current study shows net operating assets and net financial assets are priced by 
participating firms at a higher value. Since the average acquisition price is 47 percent 
higher than the target's market value in this study, acquisition premiums could be the 
cause of escalating coefficients. Second, Amir et al. (1997) demonstrates that the 
marginal value of a dollar of net deferred taxes is significantly larger than one. However, 
the coefficient of net deferred taxes in the present study is not significantly different from 
one. A possible interpretation is that acquirers do not expect the target's net deferred 
taxes to contribute extra benefits after the acquisition. Thus, acquisition premiums are not 
allocated to this item. 
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The coefficient on taxability of acquisition is $7.22 and significant at the 0.001 
level. This means that an acquirer pays $7.22 more per share when the acquisition is non-
taxable instead of taxable. Also, the coefficient of the percentage of the target's common 
stock owned by the acquirer prior to the announcement date is -$9.17 and significant at 
the 0.01 level. The negative sign, as expected, indicates that acquirers can reduce their 
acquisition price when they have owned some of the target's shares before the 
announcement date. The parameter estimates that acquiring firms can reduce the 
acquisition price by 9.17 cents per share for each one percent of pre-owned shares. 
Other variables, including management hostility, competing bids, and tender 
offers, have the expected positive signs but they are not significant at the 0.05 level. BDE, 
which indicates whether the acquisition is classified as Type B, divisive Type D, or Type 
E reorganization, is not significant but has a sign opposite of expected.33 The sign of 
BDE remains positive (not reported) even when the sample is limited to non-taxable 
acquisitions. 
Hypothesis Analysis 
Results from the base model show that net deferred taxes are priced in M&A. 
Next, net deferred taxes are decomposed into several deferred tax items to test whether 
these components provide incremental value relevance information. 
Hypothesis One 
Hia: Deferred tax assets (liabilities) of the target firms are priced as assets 
(liabilities) in M&A. 
33
 Even when a three way interaction among NOL, TRAN, and BDE is included in Model 7 to test the 
effect of BDE, the result (not reported) is not significant. 
34
 In models 5-7, non-tax-related explanatory variables typically have similar results as they do in the base 
model. Therefore, the discussion of this section only focuses on the tax-related variables. 
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To test hypothesis one, net deferred taxes are decomposed into net deferred tax 
assets and deferred tax liabilities and analyzed using Model 5. The results are presented 
in Table 4.8. The findings confirm that deferred tax assets of target firms are priced by 
participating firms as real assets. However, target firms' deferred tax liabilities are priced 
in taxable acquisitions, but not priced (or ignored) in non-taxable acquisitions. 
The coefficient of net deferred tax assets is $1.50, which is significantly greater 
than zero at the 0.01 level, but not significantly different from one (p-value=0.3826). 
That is, participating firms price target firms' net deferred tax assets in acquisition 
transactions. Also, deferred tax liabilities have a coefficient of -$1.70 which is 
significantly less than zero at the 0.001 level, but not significantly different from negative 
one (p-value=0.1671). The negative sign means that participating firms price the target 
firms' deferred tax liabilities as real liabilities. Givoly and Hayn (1992) find that one 
dollar of deferred tax liabilities is valued by investors at about 56 cents. In this study, one 
dollar of the target firms' deferred tax liabilities is valued by participating firms at -$1.70, 
which is almost triple that of Givoly and Hayn's finding. The higher value given to 
deferred tax assets and liabilities in the current study may be driven by the negotiation 
effect, which exists when the acquirer and the target have different preferences toward 
the taxability of acquisitions. The potential negotiation effect is discussed in detail later in 
the Hypothesis Three subsection that follows the presentation of the primary regression 
results. 
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Table 4.8 Value Relevance of Net Deferred Tax Assets and Deferred Tax Liabilities 
Model 5: 
AP=p0+ XtNDTA + l2NDTA *TRAN + A3DTL + A4DTL*TRAN 
+ p2OA + P3FA + pjAE + psTRAN + PffiDE 
+ p7BOWN + PtflOST + p9CB + pioTEN + puLEV 

































































































Obs (n) 690 
7
 If coefficients do not have an expected sign, the p-value is two-tailed. However, if the coefficient has an expected sign, the p-value is one-
tailed. 
NAf: The coefficient is expected to be zero. 
Notes: 
Sample consists of 690 firms listed on New York or American Stock Exchanges and acquired during]997-2006. 
Acquisition price (AP) represents the implied value of a transaction calculated by multiplying the number of common shares outstanding by the 
offering price. Net deferred taxes (DT) represents the net amount of the target's deferred tax assets minus deferred tax liability. OA 
represents the net operating assets of the target. Net operating assets are figured as book value of the shareholders' equity plus net deferred 
tax liabilities minus net financial assets. FA represents the net financial assets of the target. Net financial assets are computed as cash and 
cash equivalents plus short-term investments, minus long-term debt, current portion of long-term debt, and preferred stock. Current 
abnormal earnings (AE), which are the current earnings in the year before the announcement year minus expected normal earnings (net 
operating assets at the beginning of the year before the announcement year times cost of capital). Current earnings are calculated as income 
before extraordinary items plus tax-adjusted interest expense minus tax-adjusted other nonoperating income. AP, OA, FA, and AE are 
deflated by the number of the target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. Target's leverage 
(LEV) is the ratio of long-term debt to the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. Return on market value of equity 
(ROE) is the ratio of the target's net income before extraordinary items to the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. 
Ratio of the target's book value of equity to market value of equity (BKMV) is the target's book value of equity in the last annual report prior 
to the announcement date, divided by the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. 
Taxability of acquisition (TRAN) is an indicator variable which equals one for a non-taxable acquisition, otherwise zero. BDE is an indicator 
variable which equals one if the acquisition is classified as Type B, divisive Type D, or Type E reorganization, otherwise zero. BOWN, which 
is ranged between 0 and 1, represents the percentage of target's common stock owned by the acquirer prior to the announcement date. 
Management hostility (HOST) is an indicator variable, which equals one if the target's management opposed the acquisition, otherwise zero. 
Competing bids (CB) is an indicator variable, which equals one if a competing bidder existed, otherwise zero. Tender offer (TEN) is an 
indicator variable, which equals one if the acquisition was initiated with a tender offer, otherwise zero. 
Net deferred tax assets (NDTA) represents the target's deferred tax assets netted after the valuation allowance. DTL is the deferred tax liability 
of the target, deflated by the number of the target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
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Although the results in Table 4.8 indicate that a dollar of the target firms' 
deferred tax assets and liabilities is priced by participating firms at $1.50 and -$1.70, 
respectively, the difference between $1.50 and $1.70 is not statistically significant (p-
value=0.7410). That is, participating firms basically assign similar value to target firms' 
deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities in taxable acquisitions. 
The interaction term between deferred tax assets and taxability of acquisitions 
(DTA*TRAN) has a coefficient of $0.62 but is insignificant. This means that target's 
deferred tax assets are assigned positive values regardless of the taxability of acquisitions. 
The interaction term between deferred tax liabilities and taxability of acquisitions 
(DTL*TRAN) has a positive coefficient of $1.55. However, the sign of the coefficient is 
opposite of expectation. Also, this coefficient does not significantly differ from that of 
deferred tax liabilities (p-value=0.3871). The implication is that the target's deferred tax 
liabilities are negatively priced by participating firms in taxable acquisitions but not 
assigned a value (or ignored) in non-taxable acquisitions. It appears that participating 
firms price target firms' deferred tax assets in both taxable and non-taxable acquisitions, 
but only price deferred tax liabilities in taxable transactions. While this case seems 
contrary to expectations regarding the transferability of deferred tax attributes in non-




H2a: Target firms' valuation allowance accounts are priced in M&A. 
To test hypothesis two, net deferred tax assets are separated into two parts, gross 
deferred tax assets and a valuation allowance, in Model 6. The results are presented in 
Table 4.9, which confirms that the target firms' valuation allowance accounts are priced 
negatively in M&A. 
Table 4.9 shows that the coefficient on valuation allowance is -$1.50 and 
significant at the 0.05 level. Valuation allowance has a negative sign, which suggests that 
the participating firms view the target firms' valuation allowance as a deduction against 
real assets irrespective of the taxability of acquisitions. A further test indicates that the 
coefficient on the valuation allowance is not significantly different from negative one (p-
value=0.5042). The result that the valuation allowance is priced in taxable acquisitions is 
contrary to the expectations regarding the non-transferability of target firms' tax 
attributes in taxable acquisitions. The plausibility of this result is further investigated in 
the Hypothesis Three subsection. 
Amir et al. (1997) find that the coefficient on valuation allowance is -$0.96 and 
significant at the 0.03 level. However, the current study differs from Amir et al. (1997) in 
two significant ways. First, this study involves M&A settings while Amir et al. (1997) 
does not. Second, this study focuses on the participating firms' viewpoint of the price of 
the target's valuation allowance, while Amir et al. (1997) looks into the stock market's 
pricing of the firm's valuation allowance account. Nevertheless, regardless of these 
differences, participating firms and the stock market act similarly when pricing the 
valuation allowance account. 
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Table 4.9 Value Relevance of Valuation Allowance 
Model 6: 
AP=p0 + (pfiDTA + <p2GDTA*TRAN + <p3VA + <p4VA*TRAN 
+ IjDTL + l4DTL*TRAN + p2OA + PJFA + PJAE 
+ p5TRAN + PfiDE + p7BOWN + PgHOST + p9CB + pwTEN 















































































































'If coefficients do not have an expected sign, the p-value is two-tailed. However, if the coefficient has an expected sign, the p-value is one-tailed. 
NA?: The coefficient is expected to be zero. 
Notes: 
Sample consists of 690 firms listed on New York or American Stock Exchanges and acquired during!997-2006. 
Acquisition price (AP) represents the implied value of a transaction calculated by multiplying the number of common shares outstanding by the offering 
price. Net deferred taxes (DT) represents the net amount of the target s deferred tax assets minus deferred tax liability. OA represents the net 
operating assets of the target. Net operating assets are figured as book value of the shareholders' equity plus net deferred tax liabilities minus net 
financial assets. FA represents the net financial assets of the target Net financial assets are computed as cash and cash equivalents plus short-term 
investments, minus long-term debt, current portion of long-term debt, and preferred stock. Current abnormal earnings (AE), which are the current 
earnings in the year before the announcement year minus expected normal earnings (net operating assets at the beginning of the year before the 
announcement year times cost of capital). Current earnings are calculated as income before extraordinary items plus tax-adjusted interest expense 
minus tax-adjustedother nonoperating income. AP, OA, FA, and AE are deflated by the number of the target's common stock outstanding in the last 
annual report prior to the announcement date. Target's leverage (LEV) is the ratio of long-term debt to the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement date. Return on market value of equity (ROE) is the ratio of the target's net income before extraordinary items to the target's market 
value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. Ratio of the target's book value of equity to market value of equity (BKMV) is the target's book value of 
equity in the last annual report prior to the announcement date, divided by the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. 
Taxability of acquisition (TRAN) is an indicator variable which equals one for a non-taxable acquisition, otherwise zero. BDE is an indicator variable 
which equals one if the acquisition is classified as Type B, divisive Type D, or Type E reorganization, otherwise zero. BOWN, which is ranged between 
0 and 1, represents the percentage of the target's common stock owned by the acquirer prior to the announcement date. Management hostility (HOST) 
is an indicator variable, which equals one if the target's management opposed the acquisition, otherwise zero. Competing bids (CB) is an indicator 
variable, which equals one if a competing bidder existed, otherwise zero. Tender offer (TEN) is an indicator variable, which equals one if the 
acquisition was initiated with a tender offer, otherwise zero. 
DTL is the deferred tax liability of the target, deflated by the number of the target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the 
announcement date. Gross deferred tax assets (GDTA) represents the target's deferred tax assets before reduced by valuation allowance. VA is the 
valuation allowance of the target. 
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The coefficient of gross deferred tax assets are $1.49 and significant at the 0.01 
level. A further test shows that this coefficient is not significantly different from one (p-
value=0.3880). These results are consistent with what this study finds concerning tax-
related variables in the base model and in Model 5. 
Hypothesis Three 
H3a: Target firms' deferred tax assets from NOL and tax credit carryforwards are 
priced in M&A. 
To test hypothesis three, gross deferred tax assets is decomposed into deferred tax 
assets from NOL carryforwards (NOL), deferred tax assets from other loss carryforwards 
(OLC), deferred tax assets from tax credit carryforwards (TCC), and all other deferred 
tax assets (AODTA) in Model 7. The results are presented in Table 4.10 and indicate that 
the target firms' deferred tax assets from NOL and tax credit carryforwards are not priced. 
AODTA. The coefficient of deferred tax assets from all others is $2.53 and 
significant at the 0.001 level. Further tests show that this coefficient is significantly 
different from one (p-value=0.0285) but does not significantly differ from the coefficients 
of net operating assets and net financial assets (p-values=0.2151 and 0.0918, 
respectively). This implies that the target firms' deferred tax assets from all others are 
priced by the participating firms in a similar manner as the target firms' net operating 
assets or net financial assets. Also, the insignificant coefficient pg indicates that AODTA 
is not given more weight by the participating firms in non-taxable acquisitions. 
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Table 4.10 Value Relevance of Deferred Tax Assets from NOL Carryforwards, 
Other Loss Carryforwards, Tax Credit Carryforwards, and All Others 
Model 7: 
AP=p0 + PJNOL + p2NOL*TRAN + p3OLC + p4OLC*TRAN 
+ p5TCC + p6TCC*TRAN + p7AODTA + PsAODTA *TRAN 
+ <p3VA + <p4VA *TRAN + XiDTL + l4DTL*TRAN + p2OA 
+ psFA + p4AE + psTRAN + p^DE + p7BOWN + PgHOST 
+ p9CB + p10TEN + puLEV + p12ROE + p13BKMV+ 














































































































































 If coefficients do not have an expected sign, the p-value is two-tailed. However, if the coefficient has an expected sign, the p-value is 
one-tailed. 
NA*: The coefficient is expected to be zero. 
Notes: 
Sample consists of 690 firms listed on New York or American Stock Exchanges and acquired duringl997-2006. 
Acquisition price (AP) represents the implied value of a transaction calculated by multiplying the number of common shares 
outstanding by the offering price. Net deferred taxes (DT) represents the net amount of the target's deferred tax assets minus 
deferred tax liability. OA represents the net operating assets of the target. Net operating assets are figured as book value of the 
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shareholders' equity plus net deferred tax liabilities minus net financial assets. FA represents the net financial assets of the target. 
Net financial assets are computed as cash and cash equivalents plus short-term investments, minus long-term debt, current portion 
of long-term debt, and preferred stock. Current abnormal earnings (AE), which are the current earnings in the year before the 
announcement year minus expected normal earnings (net operating assets at the beginning of the year before the announcement 
year times cost of capital). Current earnings are calculated as income before extraordinary items plus tax-adjusted interest expense 
minus tax-adjusted other nonoperating income. AP, OA, FA, and AE are deflated by the number of the target's common stock 
outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. Target's leverage (LEV) is the ratio of long-term debt to the 
target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. Return on market value of equity (ROE) is the ratio of the target's 
net income before extraordinary items to the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. Ratio of the target's 
book value of equity to market value of equity (BKMV) is the target's book value of equity in the last annual report prior to the 
announcement date, divided by the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. 
Taxability of acquisition (TRAN) is an indicator variable which equals one for a non-taxable acquisition, otherwise zero. BDE is an 
indicator variable which equals one if the acquisition is classified as Type B, divisive Type D, or Type E reorganization, otherwise 
zero. BOWN, which is ranged between 0 and 1, represents the percentage of the target's common stock owned by the acquirer prior 
to the announcement date. Management hostility (HOST) is an indicator variable, which equals one if the target's management 
opposed the acquisition, otherwise zero. Competing bids (CB) is an indicator variable, which equals one if a competing bidder 
existed, otherwise zero. Tender offer (TEN) is an indicator variable, which equals one if the acquisition was initiated with a tender 
offer, otherwise zero. 
DTL is the deferred tax liability of the target, deflated by the number of the target's common stock outstanding in the last annual 
report prior to the announcement date. VA is the valuation allowance of the target. NOL is the deferred tax assets from the target's 
NOL carryforwards. OLC is the deferred tax assets from the target's other loss carryforwards. TCC is the deferred tax assets from 
the target's tax credit carryforwards. AODTA is all other deferred tax assets of the target. All of these tax-related variables are 
deflated by the number of the target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
The coefficient on deferred tax-other in Amir et al. (1997) is $1.02, and it is 
significant at the 0.001 level. However, the definitions of deferred tax assets from all 
others in the current study and deferred tax-other in Amir et al. (1997) are different. Amir 
et al. (1997) classifies deferred taxes into seven categories: 1) depreciation and 
amortization, 2) losses, credits, and alternative minimum taxes carryforwards, 3) 
restructuring charges, 4) environmental charges, 5) employee benefits, 6) valuation 
allowance required by SFAS No. 109, and 7) all other components. On the other hand, 
the current study decomposes gross deferred tax assets into deferred tax assets from NOL 
carryforwards, deferred tax assets from other loss carryforwards, deferred tax assets from 
tax credit carryforwards, and all other deferred tax assets. Consequently, the results of 
deferred tax assets from all others in this study and deferred tax-other in Amir et al. (1997) 
may not be directly compared. 
There are several possible explanations to this relatively high coefficient. First, 
De Waegenaere et al. (2003) argue that the market value is based on the "mean" level of 
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future tax benefits, but the book value is based on the "median" level of future tax 
benefits. Therefore, positive skewness in the distribution of future taxable income can 
cause the market-to-book ratio to exceed one. This "mean-median" effect can be one 
possible factor that escalates the coefficient of AODTA in the current study. 
Second, the "substitution" effect illustrated in Table 4.11 may be another source 
of driving up the coefficient of AODTA. Companies Tl and T2 in Table 4.11 have 
identical financial information, except that Company T2 has an additional $100 of other 
expenses recorded for book purposes, but not for tax purposes. Equation (1) in Table 4.11 
shows how those financial numbers are related in a price valuation model. Assume that 
the dependent variable (Price) and other control variables remain constant; Equation (2) 
indicates the differences of DT, OA, and AE between Companies Tl and T2. Further, 
assume the coefficients of AE and OA are equal (i.e., fa = fa)- After generalization, 
Equation (6) illustrates that the coefficient of deferred taxes is equal to two times the 
coefficient of net operating assets divided by the target's effective tax rate and, then, 
minus one. Therefore, with an effective tax rate of 35 percent, the coefficient of DT 
could be as high as 4.78 times of the coefficient of OA. In the current study, given that 
the coefficient of net operating assets is 1.63 in Model 7, it would be logical to see a P7 
coefficient as large as 7.79. 
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Table 4.11 An Illustration of the Value of Deferred Tax Assets 
Basic Equation: 
Net Operating Assets = Equity - Net Deferred Taxes - Net Financial Assets 
Assume at the beginning of the year, both companies have: 
Net Operating Assets = $2,100 
Equity = 2,200 
Net Deferred Taxes = 0 
Net Financial Assets = 100 
There is no difference between the Book and the Tax basis. 
Company Tl: At the end of the year, Company Tl has revenue $300, depreciation $100, 
and other expense $100. Assume the effective tax rate is 35 percent and the 
depreciation expense is the same for both Book and Tax purposes. Assume net 
financial assets remain unchanged. 
Book Tax 
Revenue 300 300 
Depreciation (100) (100) 
Other expense (100) (100) 
Net Income before Tax 100 100 
Tax provision (35) (35) 
Net Income 65 65 
At the end of the year, Company Tl has: 
Net Operating Assets 2,165 2,165 
Equity 2,265 2,265 
Net Deferred Taxes 0 0 
Net Financial Assets 100 100 
Company T2: Same as Company Tl, except that the "other expense" for Book purposes 
is $200, but $100 for Tax purposes. 
Book Tax 
Revenue 300 300 
Depreciation (100) (100) 
Other expense (200) (100) 
Net Income before Tax 0 100 
Tax provision 0 (35) 
Net Income 0 65 
At the end of the year, Company T2 has: 
Net Operating Assets 2,065 2,165 
Equity 2,200 2,265 
Net Deferred Taxes* 35 0 
Net Financial Assets 100 100 
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Table 4.11 An Illustration of the Value of Deferred Tax Assets (Continued) 
Price Valuation Model: 
Price =p0+ PiDT + p2OA + p3FA + P4AE ^Control Variables 
At the end of the year, DT, OA, FA, AE are as follows. 
Price = p0 + PiDT + p2OA + p3FA + P4AE ^Control Variables 
Company Tl 0 2,165 100 65-(2,100 xCC) 
Company T2 35 2,065 100 0 - (2,100 xCC) (1) 
where AE= Net Income - Beginning OA x CC; CC=Cost of Capital. 
I. Assume Price and other independent variables remain constant. Then, the difference between 
Companies Tl and T2 are: 
Price =p0+ PiDT + p2OA + p3FA + P<AE ^Control Variables 
Company Tl 100 65 
Company T2 35 (2) 
Intuitively, since the change of OA ($100) and AE ($65) is greater than the change of DT ($35), 
pi should be greater than p2 and p4. 
In a general form, it becomes: 
AOA = Aother expense 
AAE = Aother expense x (1 - ETR) 
ADT = Aother expense x ETR (3) 
where ETR=Effective Tax Rate. 
In a valuation model, the following relationship is held. 
# x A O A + ^ xAAE=jff/xADT (4) 
With the substitution of equation (3) into (4), it becomes: 
/?/=(&+&) x ETR"1-1 (5) 
Assume p4 ~ p2, then 
P,= 2p2ETRl-l (6) 
See some examples below. 
ETR Relationship 
0.50 /?,= 3.00& 
0.45 p, = 3.44& 
0.40 pi=4.00p2 
0.38 P,= 426p2 
0.35 flr 4.71//j 
0.30 Pi=5.(np2 
0.25 p,= 1.00p2 
0.20 P!=9.00p2 
025 p,= \233p2 
II. Assume the future pretax cashflows are equal in both companies. Since deferred tax assets 
provide tax benefits, Company T2 would receive higher price. Then, the difference between 
Companies Tl and T2 are: 
Price =p0+ P,DT + p2OA + P3FA + p^E ^Control Variables 
Company Tl 100 65 
Company T2 APrice 35 (7) 
Since APrice >Q,pt> 2&ETR"1 - 1. That is, when ETR=0.35,p,> A.l\p2 
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The substitution effect may happen in two ways. First, assume the acquirer does 
not want to succeed to the target's unrealized costs. Deferred tax assets from the 
contingent litigation costs are a good example to demonstrate this. Assume the additional 
$100 of other expenses recorded in Company T2 in Table 4.11 is contingent costs of the 
target firm. Also, postulate that the acquirer intends to purchase the target's assets in a 
taxable transaction such that the acquirer can avoid succeeding the target's contingent 
litigation costs. Therefore, when the acquirer evaluates the value of the target, financial 
data of Company Tl presented in Equation (1) in Table 4.11 are used by the acquirer. 
That is, the contingent litigation cost of $100 is added back to the net operating assets. 
However, this "add-back" is not noted by this study and, thereby, ignored in this study. 
Consequently, financial data of Company T2 in Equation (1) in Table 4.11 are used in the 
price valuation model for analysis in the current inquiry. Accordingly, the substitution 
effect may drive the coefficient of AODTA high. Second, assume the acquirer intends to 
utilize the target's tax attributes. Because the deferred tax assets can provide tax benefits 
to the acquirer, the acquirer is willing to pay higher price for a target with deferred tax 
assets, provided the future pretax cashflows are identical. Equation (7) in Table 4.11 
shows that the substitution effect is more appealing in this scenario. That is, the 
coefficient of deferred taxes is greater than the coefficient of net operating assets divided 
by the target's effective tax rate. 
In addition to the mean-median effect and the substitution effect, there can be a 
negotiation effect, especially in the cases where the target's BKMV ratio is low. A 
negotiation effect exists when the acquirer and the target have different preferences 
toward the taxability of acquisitions. The negotiation effect can be demonstrated through 
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the Scenarios Al and A2 in Table 4.12.35 The target's net present value to the acquirer 
and the net amount received by the target are computed in both Scenarios Al and A2, 
where the acquisitions are assumed to be non-taxable and taxable, respectively. In non-
taxable condition in Scenario Al, both the net present value to the acquirer and the net 
amount received by the target are $211,336. However, in the taxable condition in 
Scenario A2, the net present value to the acquirer is $240,880, whereas the net amount 
received by the target is $189,069, because the acquirer receives future tax savings 
through a step-up basis in the acquired assets and the target is subject to capital gains tax. 
Accordingly, the acquirer prefers a taxable transaction (i.e., Scenario A2), but the target 
prefers a non-taxable transaction (i.e., Scenario Al). Therefore, the acquirer and the 
target have conflicting interests in transaction preference. As shown in other scenarios in 
Table 4.12, the conflicting interests between the acquirer and the target exist regardless of 
the taxability of acquisitions or whether the target contains deferred tax assets or deferred 
tax liabilities. Table 4.13 summarizes the participating firms' transaction preferences as 
described in Table 4.12. Due to the conflicting interest of the participating firms' 
transaction preferences, the acquirer and the target have to negotiate and settle the 
acquisition price while determining the taxability of acquisitions. That is, the settled 
value of deferred taxes may not follow the "perceived" tax benefits to the acquirer. As a 
result, the negotiation effect may be a possible explanation on the findings in this study 
contrary to the transferability of target firms' tax attributes. 
For detailed information of these scenarios, see Appendix. 
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Table 4.12 Summary of Value Received by Participating Firms 
The potential target firms have the following basic financial information. 
Market Value 
of Assets1 
1. Fair Market Value of Assets > Book Value of Assets. 
Target A 211,336 
Target B 211,336 

















2. Book Value of Assets > Fair Market Value of Assets > Tax Basis of Assets. 
Target D 80,744 100,000 100,000 
Target E 80,744 100,000 100,000 20,000 
Target F 80,744 100,000 50,000 17,500 
3. Tax Basis of Assets > Fair Market Value of Assets. 
Target G 38,856 100,000 100,000 
Target H 38,856 100,000 100,000 20,000 
Target I 38,856 100,000 50,000 17,500 
' Effects of deferred taxes are not included. 2DTA andDTL are not included. 
For the following scenarios, assume discount rate = 10%, corporate income tax rate = 35%, and capital gains tax Rate = 
20%. Target firms A, B, C (D, E, F, and G, H, I) are predicted to have net pretax cash flows of $75,000 (22,000, and 
5,000) for the next five years and assume their residual values are zero. Assume target firms' assets are fully 
depreciated by the acquirers in five years with a straight-line method. 
Target with No DT Target with DTA Target with DTL 
Non- „ , , Non- „ , , Non- „ , 



















1. Fair Market Value of Assets > Book Value of Assets. 
Scenario3 Al A2 Bl B2 CI C2 
Net present value to the 
acquirer 
Amount paid to the target 
Net amount received by 
the target 
2. Book Value of Assets > Fair Market Value of Assets > Tax Basis of Assets. 
Scenario Dl D2 El E2 Fl F2_ 
Net present value to the 
acquirer 
Amount paid to the target 
Net amount received by 
the target 
3. Tax Basis of Assets > Fair Market Value of Assets. 
Scenario Gl G2 HI H2 II I2_ 
Net present value to the 
acquirer 
Amount paid to the target 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Moreover, Table 4.14 illustrates that when the BKMV ratio, ratio of the target's 
book value of equity to its market value of equity, is lower, the impact of the negotiation 
effect on escalating the coefficients is more appealing. Scenarios Jl and J2 in Table 4.13 
are similar to Scenarios Al and A2 in Table 4.14, except that the annual net pretax 
cashflows are $500,000 instead of $75,000. The preferential benefits, defined as the 
marginal value that a participating firm could receive in the preferred scenario, are 
$307,425 and $231,708 for the acquirer and the target, respectively, in Scenarios Jl and 
J2. However, the preferential benefits for the acquirer and the target are $29,544 and 
$22,267, respectively, in Scenarios Al and A2. Therefore, the leeway of the negotiated 
price is higher where the BKMV ratio is lower. This conclusion remains unchanged even 
when the targets have deferred tax assets (i.e., Scenarios Bl, B2, Kl, and K2) or deferred 
tax liabilities (i.e., Scenarios CI, C2, LI, and L2). Although how the participating firms 
negotiate the settled price is an unknown question, target's deferred tax attributes may be 
considered during the negotiation process, since the participating firms' perceived net 
values are affected by these tax attributes.36 Due to the negotiation, the acquirers do not 
only pay the target's deferred tax attributes purely based on the tax benefits of these 
attributes, but also on something beyond these tax benefits. As a result, the coefficients of 
deferred tax attributes could be driven higher by the negotiation effect, where the target's 
BKMV ratio is lower. Therefore, the interaction of the negotiation effect and the target's 
BKMV ratio could be a potential explanation to the relatively high magnitudes of the 
coefficients on the deferred tax variables found in the current study. 
For example, stock price is related to future earning expectation, which is a function of valuation 
allowance (Bauman and Das, 2004). Also, deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards may signal a 
higher likelihood of future losses and could negatively impact stock price (Amir and Sougiannis, 1999). 
Moreover, targets' DTA and DTL affect the amount of the participating firms' preferential benefits. 
Table 4.14 The Impact of the Negotiation Effect and the BKMV Ratio 
The potential target firms have the following basic financial information. 
Market Value Book Value Tax Basis of Deferred Tax Deferred Tax 
of Assets1 of Assets2 Assets Assets Liabilities 
High BKMV Targets 
Target A 211,336 100,000 100,000 
Target B 211,336 100,000 100,000 20,000 
Target C 211,336 100,000 50,000 17,500 
Low BKMV Targets 
Target J 1,258,541 100,000 100,000 
Target K 1,258,541 100,000 100,000 20,000 
Target L 1,258,541 100,000 50,000 17,500 
Effects of deferred taxes are not included. 
2
 DTA and DTL are not included. 
For the following scenarios, assume discount rate = 10%, corporate income tax rate = 35%, and capital gains tax Rate = 
20%. Target firms A, B, C (J, K, L) are predicted to have net pretax cash flows of $75,000 (500,000) for the next five 
years and assume their residual values are zero. Assume target firms' assets are fully depreciated by the acquirers in 
five years with a straight-line method. 
High BKMV Scenario' 
Net present value to the 
acquirer 
Amount paid to the target 
Net amount received by 
the target 
PB to the acquirer4 
PB to the target 
Low BKMV Scenario 
Net present value to the 
acquirer 
Amount paid to the target 
Net amount received by 
the target 
PB to the acquirer 
PB to the target 














 For detailed information of these examples, see 
4






























































In this study, the sample has 551 (79.86 percent) and 197 (28.55 percent) firms 
with the BKMV ratios lower than one and one-third, respectively. According to the 
BKMV ratio, the sample is divided into three groups: low, normal, and high BKMV 
groups. The base model and Models 5-7 are rerun on these three groups and results are 
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reported in Table 4.15. Generally, these empirical results confirm that the magnitude of 
the coefficients of the target's tax attributes is associated with the target's BKMV ratio. 


















































































'27 observations which have a negative BKMV ratio are deleted, because negative BKMV w<"> maL tin i omparison meaningless. 
* If coefficients do not have an expected sign, the p-value is two-tailed. However, if the coefficient has an expected sign, the p-value is one-tailed. 
Notes: 
Sample consists of 690 firms listed on New York or American Stock Exchanges and acquired during!997-2006. 
Ratio of the target's book value of equity to market value of equity (BKMV) is the target's book value of equity in the last annual report prior to the 
announcement date, divided by the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. Net deferred taxes (DT) represents the net amount of 
the target's deferred tax assets minus deferred tax liability. DTL is the deferred tax liability of the target, deflated by the number of the target's 
common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. VA is the valuation allowance of the target. NOL is the deferred 
tax assets from the target's NOL carryforwards. OLC is the deferred tax assets from the target's other loss carryforwards. TCC is the deferred tax 
assets from the target's tax credit carryforwards. AODTA is all other deferred tax assets of the target. All of these tax-related variables are deflated by 
the number of the target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
Table 4.15 presented above shows the association between the target's BKMV 
ratio and the coefficients of deferred tax variables. A notable thing is that NOL becomes 
significant where the subsamples have relatively high BKMV ratio. However, OLC and 
TCC remain insignificant irrespective of the level of the target's BKMV ratio. These 
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findings imply that NOL is assigned positive value by the participating firms when the 
target's BKMV ratio is high, but NOL is ignored when the BKMV ratio is relatively low. 
Since the BKMV ratio indicates the capability of the target to generate future pretax 
cashflows, a possible explanation to these findings is that the acquirers are attracted by 
targets' NOL when the targets have high BKMV ratios. Therefore, it appears that 
acquirers are willing to price the target's NOL. However, when the targets have lower 
BKMV ratios, the acquirers are more interested in targets' earnings capability than their 
tax attributes. Another possible explanation is that when the target's BKMV ratio is lower, 
the negotiation effect is more appealing, making target's tax attributes irrelevant to the 
settled acquisition price. Consequently, the target's NOL carryforwards are ignored by 
the participating firms when the target's BKMV ratio is relatively low. 
Moreover, the relatively high magnitude of the coefficient on AODTA indicates 
that this variable might capture information about other variables such as net operating 
assets and net financial assets (Amir et al., 1997). Finally, the high coefficient of AODTA 
may imply a model misspecification. A potential missing variable may be correlated to 
the AODTA such that the coefficient of AODTA is escalated. 
NOL, P L C , and TCC. The results indicate that none of the coefficients on 
deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards (NOL), deferred tax assets from other loss 
carryforwards (OLC), deferred tax assets from tax credit carryforwards (TCC) are 
significant. The interaction terms between these three components and taxability of 
acquisition are not significant either. The evidence does not indicate that participating 
firms price these three components of deferred tax assets. The relatively few firms 
containing the OLC and TCC information (104 and 240 observations, respectively) may 
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contribute to the insignificant coefficients on these two variables. While NOL and tax 
credit carryforwards may be valuable in business valuation, Section 382 limitation on the 
use of these carryovers may reduce the value of these tax attributes (Moore and Pruitt, 
1987). The statutory restraint might be the reason the participating firms do not give 
value to these deferred tax assets components in non-taxable acquisitions. Furthermore, 
the mixed information signals by the existence of NOL, OLC, and TCC may negate the 
expectation on future earnings (Amir and Sougiannis, 1999), driving the coefficients of 
these variables to zero in taxable acquisitions. 
These findings are inconsistent with prior research showing that NOL 
carryforwards are priced by the market (Moore and Pruitt, 1987; Haw et al., 1987; Hayn, 
1989). However, those studies differ from the current research in threefold. First, the 
prior literature used the event study methodology but the current study employs price 
valuation models. Second, the dependent variable in these studies is cumulative abnormal 
returns, while acquisition price is the dependent variable in the current study. Third, these 
studies focus on the viewpoint of the market in pricing the NOL carryforwards. 
Conversely, this study emphasizes on the value of deferred tax assets from NOL 
carryforwards given by the participating firms during the M&A process. Overall, the 
different results between prior studies and the current study suggest that the market and 
the participating firms have different perspectives in pricing the value of target firms' 
NOL carryforwards. 
Also, this study's results are different from Zeng (2003) in which NOL 
carryforwards are priced by the market. While Zeng (2003) employs a price valuation 
model, Canadian data is used in his study. Conversely, Amir et al. (1997) presents a 
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comparable result where deferred tax-loss, credit, and AMT carryforwards are not 
significant. In the current study, deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards, deferred 
tax assets from other loss carryforwards, and deferred tax assets from tax credit 
carryforwards are combined to establish a new variable, which is equivalent to deferred 
tax-loss, credit, and AMT carryforwards in Amir et al. (1997). Nevertheless, neither the 
new variable nor the interaction term between the new variable and taxability of 
acquisition are significant (p-values=0.8697 and 0.2715, respectively). 
VA. While significant in Model 6, the valuation allowance is not significant in 
Model 7. Consequently, the results for hypothesis two are mixed. Multicollinearity could 
be a possible factor, especially in that the valuation allowance and the deferred tax assets 
from NOL carryforwards are highly correlated (Pearson (Spearman) correlations = 0.82 
(0.59)). Miller and Skinner (1998) find that the most important explanatory variable for 
the valuation allowance is the level of firms' tax credit and tax loss carryforwards. 
Consequently, in this study, the valuation allowance and the deferred tax assets from 
NOL carryforwards are added to create a new variable. Including this new variable in 
Model 7 mitigates the multicollinearity concern, but the coefficient on the new variable is 
not significant (p-value=0.6415). 
Amir et al. (1997) combines the valuation allowance as well as the deferred tax-
loss, credit, and AMT carryforwards to become the net realizable value of deferred tax 
assets from losses and credits carryforwards. Likewise, the current study includes in 
Model 7 a new variable which combines the valuation allowance, deferred tax assets 
from NOL carryforwards, deferred tax assets from other loss carryforwards, and deferred 
That is, the new variable = NOL - VA. 
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tax assets from tax credit carryforwards.38 Similar to Amir et al. (1997), the coefficient of 
this new variable is not significant (p-value=0.7861). 
Summary 
The empirical findings in this chapter support Hia. Results of H2a and H3a are 
mixed. That is, participating firms view target firms' net deferred tax assets as real assets 
and assign it value in acquisitions. Also, participating firms view a target firm's deferred 
tax liabilities as real liabilities and assign negative value in an acquisition. Additionally, 
the valuation allowance is priced negatively by participating firms against target firms' 
deferred tax assets. Nevertheless, tax credit carryforwards are not priced by participating 
firms. Deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards are assigned value by the 
participating firms when the target's BKMV ratio is high, but NOL is ignored by the 
participating firms when the target's BKMV ratio is low. 
Table 4.16 presents the comparisons of the current study and prior research. There 
are several major differences between this study and prior research. First, this study 
applies the price valuation models to M&A settings. Second, the current study 
investigates the participating firms' viewpoints rather than the market's. Third, prior 
research in M&A focuses on NOL and tax credit carryforwards, but this study 
emphasizes deferred tax assets from NOL and tax credit carryforwards as well as 
deferred tax liabilities. 
The next chapter, Chapter 5, provides a summary and discussions of the 
implication of this study. Also, the limitations of this study are noted and opportunities 
for future research are presented. 
38
 The new variable = NOL + OLC + TCC - VA. 
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Table 4.16 Comparison of the Current Study to Prior Research 
Study 
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DTL: Yes, but only in 
taxable acquisitions. 
VA: mixed results 
NOL: Yes, but only when 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize this study's research findings 
concerning the value relevance of deferred taxes in M&A. The primary research 
objective is to investigate whether participating firms give value to target firms' deferred 
tax assets and its components when determining acquisition price. Steps toward meeting 
this objective are outlined in the chapter summaries below. Furthermore, conclusions 
relative to the hypothesis tests are discussed, implications and limitations of the study are 
disclosed, and suggestions for future research are presented. 
Summary of Previous Chapters 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the main concern in an M&A transaction is how to 
determine the economic benefits and burdens contained in the transaction and allocate 
them among the participating parties. Part of this concern is revealed in the question of 
how the participating firms price the target firm's tax attributes when determining the 
acquisition price. Since SFAS No. 109 requires companies to disclose in their financial 
statements the approximate tax effect of each type of temporary difference and 
carryforwards, answers to the aforementioned question can provide insights as to whether 
the mandatory tax disclosures give value relevance information to the participating 
parties in M&A. 
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Chapter 2 includes a selected literature review of the value relevance of deferred 
taxes. Prior research in non-M&A as well as M&A settings is examined. Studies in non-
M&A scenarios show that the market views firms' deferred tax liabilities as real 
liabilities. However, results on deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards are mixed 
(e.g., Amir et al., 1997; Zeng, 2003). On the other hand, prior research on the effects of 
deferred taxes in M&A indicates that the market reacts positively to tax carryforwards. 
Overall, prior studies find that the market gives value to firms' deferred taxes. 
Nevertheless, whether participating firms price target firms' deferred taxes and the 
components of deferred tax assets in determining the acquisition price has not been 
empirically investigated. 
The methodology and models used in this study are developed and outlined in 
Chapter 3. Two research methodologies employed in prior research are price valuation 
models and event studies. Although both methodologies are adopted in non-M&A 
settings, only event studies have been applied to this question in M&A scenarios. Since 
this study focuses on the viewpoints of participating firms rather than those of the market, 
using price valuation models is more appropriate than using event studies. 
Based upon the work of Feltham and Ohlson (1995), Amir et al. (1997), and 
Ayers et al. (2003), this inquiry develops a base model which relates acquisition price to 
deferred taxes, net operating assets, net financial assets, current abnormal earnings, and 
other control variables. Furthermore, net deferred taxes are decomposed into several 
items to test the incremental value of these deferred tax components. Therefore, deferred 
taxes are partitioned into net deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities (DTL) in 
Model 5; separated into gross deferred tax assets, a valuation allowance (VA), and DTL 
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in Model 6; and into deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards (NOL), deferred tax 
assets from other loss carryforwards (OLC), deferred tax assets from tax credit 
carryforwards (TCC), and all other deferred tax assets (AODTA), VA, and DTL in Model 
7. 
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the research results. Summary statistics show 
that the acquisition price is 47 percent higher than the target firms' market value four 
weeks before the announcement date. Results of the base model indicate that deferred 
taxes are given value in the acquisition price. Results of Model 5 suggest that the target 
firms' deferred tax assets are viewed as real assets and given a positive price by 
participating firms. The target firms' deferred tax liabilities are viewed as real liabilities 
and valued negatively in taxable acquisitions, but they are ignored in non-taxable 
acquisitions. Findings in Model 6 confirm that the valuation allowance is priced 
negatively by participating firms, whereas these results are not confirmed in Model 7. 
Finally, results of Model 7 do not find that value is given to the target firms' deferred tax 
assets from other loss carryforwards (OLC) and deferred tax assets from tax credit 
carryforwards (TCC), whereas deferred tax assets from all others (AODTA) is priced 
positively. Deferred tax assets from NOL are assigned value when the target's BKMV 
ratio is high, but ignored when the target's BKMV ratio is low. 
Summary of Conclusions 
Three research questions presented in this study for investigation are as follows. 
1. Are target firms' deferred tax assets (liabilities) priced as assets (liabilities) in 
M&A? 
2. Are target firms' valuation allowance accounts priced in M&A? 
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3. Are target firms' deferred tax assets from NOL and tax credit carryforwards 
priced in M&A? 
With the application of price valuation models, this study finds that the target 
firms' deferred tax assets and its components are generally priced by participating firms 
in determining the acquisition price. Specifically, findings in the base model show that 
participating firms give value to the target firms' deferred taxes while determining the 
acquisition price. However, further investigation discloses that the general results in the 
base model are driven by the AODTA, which may be caused by the mean-median effect, 
substitution effect, and negotiation effect rather than the tax savings of target firms' 
deferred taxes. 
The stock market views firms' deferred tax assets as real assets and assigns value 
to them (Amir et al., 1997; Ayers, 1998). Moreover, firms' deferred tax liabilities are 
considered as real liabilities and priced negatively (Givoly and Hayn, 1992; Chaney and 
Jetter, 1994; Ayers, 1998; Citron, 2001). While the current study is involved with M&A 
settings, the results of Model 5 are consistent with non-M&A scenarios. That is, the 
participating firms view the target firms' deferred tax assets as real assets and price it 
positively in determining the acquisition price regardless of the taxability of acquisitions. 
However, the target firms' deferred tax liabilities are priced negatively in taxable 
acquisitions, but ignored in non-taxable transactions. 
Similar to Amir et al. (1997), results of Model 6 in this study show that 
participating firms regard the target firms' valuation allowance as a deduction against the 
target firms' deferred tax assets and price it negatively. However, when gross deferred 
tax assets are decomposed into deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards (NOL), 
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deferred tax assets from other loss carryforwards (OLC), deferred tax assets from tax 
credit carryforwards (TCC), and all other deferred tax assets (AODTA) in Model 7, the 
valuation allowance becomes non-significant. This change may imply that 
multicollinearity between valuation allowance and other variables is present. Following 
Amir et al. (1997), a new variable, net realizable value of deferred tax assets from losses 
and credits carryforwards, is created by combining valuation allowance, deferred tax 
assets from NOL carryforwards (NOL), deferred tax assets from other loss carryforwards 
(OLC), and deferred tax assets from tax credit carryforwards (TCC). Compatible to Amir 
et al. (1997), the results indicate that acquiring firms do not assign value to the target 
firms' net realizable deferred tax assets from losses and credits carryforwards. 
Nevertheless, findings in Model 7 show that the target firms' deferred tax assets from all 
others are priced positively by acquiring firms, although its relatively high coefficient 
may be caused by a model misspecification. For a summary of empirical results in this 
study, see Table 5.1. 





















































































































































































































































































f If coefficients do not have an expected sign, the p-value is two-tailed. However, if the coefficient has an expected sign, the p-value is one-tailed. 
$N/A: Coefficient is expected to be zero. 
Notes: 
Sample consists of 690 firms listed on New York or American Stock Exchanges and acquired during 1997-2006. 
Acquisition price (AP) represents the implied value of a transaction calculated by multiplying the number of common shares outstanding by the offering 
price. Net deferred taxes (DT) represents the net amount of the target's deferred tax assets minus deferred tax liability. OA represents the net 
operating assets of the target. Net operating assets are figured as book value of the shareholders' equity plus net deferred tax liabilities minus net 
financial assets. FA represents the net financial assets of the target. Net financial assets are computed as cash and cash equivalents plus short-term 
investments, minus long-term debt, current portion of long-term debt, and preferred stock. Current abnormal earnings (AE), which are the current 
earnings in the year before the announcement year minus expected normal earnings (net operating assets at the beginning of the year before the 
announcement year ) * times cost of capital). Current earnings are calculated as income before extraordinary items plus tax-adjusted interest 
expense minus tax-adjusted other nonoperating income. AP, OA, FA, and AE are deflated by the number of the target's common stock outstanding in 
the last annual report prior to the announcement date. Target's leverage (LEV) is the ratio of long-term debt to the target's market value 4 weeks 
prior to the announcement date. Return on market value of equity (ROE) is the ratio of the target's net income before extraordinary items to the 
target's market value 4 weeks prior to the announcement date. Ratio of the target's book value of equity to market value of equity (BKMV) is the 
target's book value of equity in the last annual report prior to the announcement date, divided by the target's market value 4 weeks prior to the 
announcement date. 
Taxability of acquisition (TRAN) is an indicator variable which equals one for a non-taxable acquisition, otherwise zero. BDE is an indicator variable 
which equals one if the acquisition is classified as Type B, divisive Type D, or Type E reorganization, otherwise zero. SOWN, which is ranged 
between 0 and 1, represents the percentage of the target's common stock owned by the acquirer prior to the announcement date. Management 
hostility (HOST) is an indicator variable, which equals one if the target's management opposed the acquisition, otherwise zero. Competing bids (CB) 
is an indicator variable, which equals one if a competing bidder existed, otherwise zero. Tender offer (TEN) is an indicator variable, which equals 
one if the acquisition was initiated with a tender offer, otherwise zero. 
DTL is the deferred tax liability of the target, deflated by the number of the target's common stock outstanding in the last annual report prior to the 
announcement date. VA is the valuation allowance of the target. NOL is the deferred tax assets from the target's NOL carryforwards. OLC is the 
deferred tax assets from the target's other loss carryforwards. TCC is the deferred tax assets from the target's tax credit carryforwards. AODTA is 
all other deferred tax assets of the target. All of these tax-related variables are deflated by the number of the target's common stock outstanding in 
the last annual report prior to the announcement date. 
Prior research (Moore and Pruitt, 1987; Haw et al, 1987; Hayn, 1989) shows that 
NOL carryforwards are priced by the market. Nevertheless, the current study finds that 
participating firms do not assign value to deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards in 
determining the acquisition price. The fact that these findings are different suggests that 
102 
the market and the participating firms have different perspectives when evaluating the tax 
benefits of the target firms' NOL carryforwards. 
The results of this inquiry point out that the coefficients of deferred taxes and its 
components are greater than one. This study identifies three possible factors that may 
escalate the coefficients: the mean-median effect (De Waegenaere et al., 2003), the 
negotiation effect, and the substitution effect. Nevertheless, this study cannot rule out the 
possibility that these tax related variables may capture some information about other 
variables. 
Prior research (e.g., Amir et al., 1997; Ayers, 1998) suggests that reporting 
deferred tax components as required by SFAS No. 109 provides value relevance 
information to the market. By and large, this study confirms their findings. However, this 
research examination does extend the extant literature from non-M&A to M&A settings. 
That is, this study finds that deferred taxes and its components, as required by SFAS No. 
109, provide value relevance information to the participating firms in determining the 
value of these deferred tax items. 
Implications 
The results of this study show that the target firms' deferred taxes are given value 
by participating firms in determining the acquisition price. In practice, the models 
developed in the current study can be used to set the benchmark when the participating 
firms are negotiating the acquisition price. Specifically, for every one dollar of the target 
firms' deferred taxes, acquiring firms should be expected to pay $1.34. The amount of 
$1.34 holds irrespective of the year of acquisition or the industries in which the target is 
classified, but it is worthwhile to note that the standard error of deferred taxes is $0.38. 
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Therefore, the concurrent value of target firm's deferred taxes by the participating firms 
could have some deviation from $1.34, but the standard error of $0.38 should provide 
guidance on this deviation. 
This study finds that the pricing of target firms' deferred tax liabilities is related to 
the taxability of acquisitions. That is, participating firms assign negative value to target 
firms' deferred tax liabilities in taxable acquisitions, but ignore them in non-taxable 
acquisitions. Therefore, acquirers and targets should note the impact of taxability of 
acquisitions on the pricing of deferred tax liabilities. 
Results of decomposing the target firms' deferred taxes indicate that participating 
firms do not give value to the targets' deferred tax assets other loss carryforwards and tax 
credit carryforwards. Moreover, the participating firms assign price to deferred tax assets 
from NOL carryforwards only when the target's BKMV ratio is high. These findings are 
different from prior research (Moore and Pruitt, 1987; Haw et al., 1987; Hayn, 1989), 
which shows the market gives value to target firms' NOL and tax credit carryforwards. 
Therefore, the different perspectives between the participating firms and the market 
should be noted. Specifically, when determining the acquisition price, potential acquirers 
and targets should value the target firms' deferred taxes in accordance with the viewpoint 
of participating firms rather than the market. Findings in this study could be used as a 
yardstick to guide the participating firms through the valuation and negotiation process. 
Limitations 
The sample is limited to the target firms delisted from the New York or American 
Stock Exchanges. That is, targets categorized as private firms or relatively small public 
firms are not represented in the study. Therefore, findings in the current study may not be 
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generalized to explain the value of deferred taxes for these types of targets. Also, 
following Amir et al. (1997), this inquiry does not include target firms classified as 
financial institutions or electric utilities. Thus, results shown in this study may not be 
used to interpret the value relevance of deferred taxes in acquisitions involving a target 
considered as a financial institution or electric utility firm. 
Findings in the current study show that the coefficient of deferred tax assets from 
all others (AODTA) is relatively high. The present examination interprets this high 
magnitude as being driven by the mean-median effect, the negotiation effect, and the tax 
rate effect. However, a potential model misspecification might not be ruled out. 
Suggestions for Future Research 
The limitations noted above suggest possible extensions for this study. For 
example, since the coefficient of deferred tax assets from all others (AODTA) is 
relatively high, AODTA might capture the information of other variables. This indicates 
that a model misspecification may be present. Further investigation into identifying these 
potential missing variables could improve the understanding of how the participating 
firms price the target firms' deferred taxes in M&A. Specifically, the relationship 
between acquisition price and the target firm's R&D expenses and onetime write-off 
could be scrutinized. 
This study finds that the target firms' gross deferred tax assets are priced by 
participating firms when determining the acquisition price. However, decomposing gross 
deferred tax assets into four components indicate that these results are driven solely by 
the deferred tax assets from all others. Amir et al. (1997) list 25 deferred tax items 
obtained from notes in the targets' financial statements and categorize 7 deferred tax 
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components in their study, but the current study only uses 4 deferred tax assets items. 
Further decomposing of AODTA in this study may reveal more value relevance 
information from tax footnotes in financial statements. 
Congress has been concerned with the tax benefits taken by merging firms and 
has established some constraints on the use of the target firms' tax attributes by the 
acquirers. For example, Sections 382 limits the annual amount of the targets' tax 
carryover (e.g., NOL, capital loss, tax credit carryforwards, and so on) that could be 
utilized by the acquiring firms following acquisitions. However, findings in this study 
indicate that participating firms do not give value to target firms' deferred tax assets from 
other loss carryforwards and tax credit carryforwards in determining the acquisition price. 
Additionally, the acquirers assign value to deferred tax assets from NOL carryforwards 
only when the target's BKMV ratio is high. This implies that participating firms do not 
expect the utilization of the tax benefits associated with these target firms' tax attributes. 
However, since data analyzed in this study are all restricted by Section 382, one cannot 
conclude whether these restrictions have effectively decreased the value of the target 
firms' tax carryovers. Therefore, further research could be taken to investigate the 
effectiveness of the Section 382 limitation, especially in the perspectives of participating 
firms rather than the market. 
The objective of the FASB Interpretation No. 48 ("FIN 48," FASB, 2006a) is to 
establish a consistent threshold for recognizing current and deferred taxes. FIN 48 is 
intended to increase the relevance and comparability in financial reporting of income 
taxes (FASB, 2006a). Further research can be pursued in determining whether FIN 48 
provides incremental value relevance information in non-M&A as well as M&A settings. 
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Summary 
This study provides evidence that participating firms give value to target firms' 
deferred taxes in determining the acquisition price, although the valuation may be driven 
by the negotiation effect rather than the tax savings of the target firms' tax attributes. 
Particularly, this inquiry reveals the viewpoints of the participating firms rather than the 
market in pricing the tax benefits from the target firms' NOL carryforwards, other loss 
carryforwards, and tax credit carryforwards. Prior research shows that the market gives 
value to the target firms' NOL and tax credit carryforwards in deciding the stock price. 
However, the current study finds that participating firms do not give value to the target 
firms' deferred tax assets from other loss carryforwards and tax credit carryforwards. 
Moreover, the participating firms assign value to deferred tax assets from NOL 
carryforwards only when the target's BKMV ratio is high. Findings in this study can help 
us understand the participating firms' pricing of the target firms' deferred taxes. In 
practice, the results could provide a yardstick for the potential acquiring and target firms 






1. Fair Market Value of Assets > Book Value of Assets. 
Assume there are three potential target firms with basic financial information as follows. 
Market Value Book Value Tax Basis of 
of Assets1 of Assets Assets 
Target A 211,336 100,000 100,000 
Target B 211,336 100,000 100,000 







Effects of deferred taxes are not included. 
For the following scenarios, assume discount rate = 10%, corporate income tax rate = 35%, and capital gains tax Rate = 
20%. Target firms are predicted to have net pretax cash flows of $75,000 for the next five years and assume their 
residual values are zero. Assume target firms' assets are fully depreciated by the acquirers in five years with a straight-
line method. 
Target A 
Scenario Al: An acquirer pays $211,336 to acquire Target A in a non-taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 
Depreciation (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) 
Taxable income 55,000 55,000 55,000 55,000 55,000 
Tax expense (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) 
Net tax payment (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) (19,250) 
Net cash flows 55,750 55,750 55,750 55,750 55,750 
Net present value to the acquirer: 211,336 
Amount paid to the target: 211,336 
Taxable gains to the target: 0 
Capital gains tax of the target: 0 
Net amount received by the target: 211,336 
Scenario A2: An acquirer pays $211,336 to acquire Target A in a taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 
Depreciation2 (42,267) (42,267) (42,267) (42,267) (42,267) 
Taxable income 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 
Tax expense (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) 
Net tax payment (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) 
Net cash flows 63,544 63,544 63,544 63,544 63,544 
Net present value to the acquirer: 240,880 
Amount paid to the target: 211,336 
Taxable gains to the target: 111,336 
Capital gains tax of the target: (22,267) 
Net amount received by the target: 189,069 
2
 Depreciation = $211,336/5 = $42,267. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax paid by the target is 
neglected. 
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Scenario A3: An acquirer pays $240,880 to acquire' 
Net pretax cash flows 
Depreciation3 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
























 The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax 










paid by the tar 
,880-211,336)75 = $5,909. 
Target B 
Scenario Bl: An acquirer pays $211,336 to acquire' 




Amortization of Deferred Tax Assets5 
Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 

























get is neglected. 















 Deferred tax assets of $20,000 are amortized over the five years' 
Scenario B2: An acquirer pays $211,336 to acquire' 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Deferred tax assets: 





































































Depreciation = $211,336/5 = $42,267. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax 
paid by the target is neglected. 
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Scenario B3: An acquirer pays $240,880 to acquire Target B in a taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 
Depreciation7 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Deferred tax assets: 











































The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax paid by the target is neglected. 
8
 Amortization of goodwill from acquisition = ($240,880-211,336)/5 = $5,909. 
Target C 
Scenario CI: An acquirer pays $211,336 to acquire Target C in a non-taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 
Depreciation (10,000) (10,000) (10,000) (10,000) (10,000) 
Taxable income 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 65,000 
Tax expense (22,750) (22,750) (22,750) (22,750) (22,750) 
Net tax payment (22,750) (22,750) (22,750) (22,750) (22,750) 
Net cash flows 52,250 52,250 52,250 52,250 52,250 
Net present value to the acquirer: 198,069 
Amount paid to the target: 211,336 
Taxable gains to the target: 0 
Capital gains tax of the target: 0 
Net amount received by the target: 211,336 
Scenario C2: An acquirer pays $211,336 to acquire Target C in a taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 75,000 
Depreciation9 (42,267) (42,267) (42,267) (42,267) (42,267) 
Taxable income 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 32,733 
Taxexpense (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) 
Net tax payment (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) (11,456) 
Net cash flows 63,544 63,544 63,544 63,544 63,544 
Net present value to the acquirer: 240,880 
Amount paid to the target: 211,336 
Taxable gains to the target: 161,336 
Capital gains tax of the target: (32,267) 
Net amount received by the target: 179,069 
Depreciation = $211,336/5 = $42,267. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax 
paid by the target is neglected. 
I l l 
Scenario C3: An acquirer pays $240,880 to acquire' 
Net pretax cash flows 
Depreciation10 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
















































""'"The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax paid by the target is neglected. 
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 Amortization of goodwill from acquisition = ($240,880-211,336)/5 = $5,909. 
2. Book Value of Assets > Fair Market Value of Assets > Tax Basis of Assets. 
Assume there are three potential target firms with basic financial information as follows. 
Market Book Value Tax Basis of Deferred Deferred 
















Effects of deferred taxes are not included. 
2
 DTA and DTL are not included. 
For the following scenarios, assume discount rate = 10%, corporate income tax rate = 35%, and capital 
gains tax Rate = 20%. Target firms are predicted to have net pretax cash flows of $22,000 for the next five 
years and assume their residual values are zero. Assume target firms' assets are fully depreciated by the 
acquirers in five years with a straight-line method. 
Target D 
Scenario Dl: An acquirer pays $80,744 to acquire Target D in a non-taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 
Depreciation (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) 
Taxable income 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 
Tax expense (700) (700) (700) (700) (700) 
Net tax payment (700) (700) (700) (700) (700) 
Net cash flows 21,300 21,300 21,300 21,300 21,300 
Net present value to the acquirer: 80,744 
Amount paid to the target: 80,744 
Taxable gains to the target: 0 
Capital gains tax of the target: 0 
Net amount received by the target: 80,744 
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Scenario D2: An acquirer pays $80,744 to acquire Target D in a taxable acquisition. 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Net amount received by the target: 
Depreciation = $80,744/5 = $16,149. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax 
paid by the target is neglected. 
Scenario D3: An acquirer pays $75,634 to acquire Target D in a taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 




Net tax payment 







































































Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Net amount received by the target: 
Depreciation= $75,634/5 = $15,127. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax 
paid by the target is neglected. 
Target E 
Scenario El: An acquirer pays $80,744 to acquire Target E in a non-taxable acquisition. 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 
Depreciation (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) 
Taxable income 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 
Tax expense (700) (700) (700) (700) (700) 
Amortization of Deferred Tax Assets4 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 
Net tax payment (3,300) (3,300) (3,300) (3,300) (3,300) 
Net cash flows 25,300 25,300 25,300 25,300 25,300 
Net present value to the acquirer: 95,907 
Amount paid to the target: 80,744 
Taxable gains to the target: 0 
Capital gains tax of the target: 0 
Net amount received by the target: 80,744 
Deferred tax assets of $20,000 are amortized over the five years via a straight-line method. 
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Scenario E2\ An acquirer pays $80,744 to acquire Target E in a taxable acquisition. 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Deferred tax assets: 





































Depreciation = $80,744/5 = $16,149. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax 
paid by the target is neglected. 
Scenario E3: An acquirer pays $75,634 tc 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Deferred tax assets: 
Net amount received by the target: 
6
 Depreciation= $75,634/5 =$15,127. The 
by the target is neglected. 
Scenario Fl: An acquirer pays $80,744to 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Net amount received by the target: 




































additional step-up basis from the capital 
Target F 



















































Scenario F2: An acquirer pays $80,744 to acquire Target F in a taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 




Net tax payment 




































Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Net amount received by the target: 
Depreciation = $80,744 /5 = $16,149. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax 
paid by the target is neglected. 
Scenario F3: An acquirer pays $75,634 to acquire Target F in a taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 22,000 
Depreciation8 (15,127) (15,127) (15,127) (15,127) (15,127) 
Taxable income 6,873 6,873 6,873 6,873 6,873 
Tax expense (2,406) (2,406) (2,406) (2,406) (2,406) 
Net tax payment (2,406) (2,406) (2,406) (2,406) (2,406) 
Net cash flows 19,594 19,594 19,594 19,594 19,594 
Net present value to the acquirer: 74,278 
Amount paid to the target: 75,634 
Taxable gains to the target: 25,634 
Capital gains tax of the target: 5,127 
Net amount received by the target: 70,507 
Depreciation = $75,634/5 = $15,127. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax 
paid by the target is neglected. 
3. Tax Basis of Assets > Fair Market Value of Assets. 
Assume there are three potential target firms with basic financial information as follows. 
Market Book Value Tax Basis of Deferred Deferred 
















Effects of deferred taxes are not included. 
2
 DTA and DTL are not included. 
For the following scenarios, assume discount rate = 10%, corporate income tax rate = 35%, and capital 
gains tax Rate = 20%. Target firms are predicted to have net pretax cash flows of $5,000 for the next five 
years and assume their residual values are zero. Assume target firms' assets are fully depreciated by the 
acquirers in five years with a straight-line method. 
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Target G 
Scenario Gl: An acquirer pays $38,856 to acquire Target G in a non-taxable acquisition. 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Depreciation (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) 
Taxable income (15,000) (15,000) (15,000) (15,000) (15,000) 
Tax benefit 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 
Net cash flows 10,250 10,250 10,250 10,250 10,250 
Net present value to the acquirer: 38,856 
Amount paid to the target: 38,856 
Taxable gains to the target: 0 
Capital gains tax of the target: 0 
Net amount received by the target: 38,856 
Scenario G2: An acquirer pays $38,856 to acquire Target G in a taxable acquisition. 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 




Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Net amount received by the target: 
Depreciation = $38,856/5 = $7,771. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax paid 
by the target is neglected. 
Scenario G3: An acquirer pays $22,631 to acquire Target G in a taxable acquisition. 



































Net tax payment 




































Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Net amount received by the target: 
Depreciation = $22,631/5= $4,526. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax paid 
by the target is neglected. 
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Target H 
Scenario HI: An acquirer pays $38,856 to acquire Target H in a non-taxable acquisition. 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Depreciation (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) 
Taxable income (15,000) (15,000) (15,000) (15,000) (15,000) 
Tax benefit 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 5,250 
Amortization of Deferred Tax Assets4 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 4,000 
Net cash flows 14,250 14,250 14,250 14,250 14,250 
Net present value to the acquirer: 54,019 
Amount paid to the target: 38,856 
Taxable gains to the target: 0 
Capital gains tax of the target: 0 
Net amount received by the target: 38,856 
Deferred tax assets of $20,000 are amortized over the five years via a straight-line method. 
Scenario H2: An acquirer pays $38,856 to acquire Target H in a taxable acquisition. 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 




Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Deferred tax assets: 
































Depreciation = $38,856/5 = $7,771. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax paid 
by the target is neglected. 
Scenario H3: An acquirer pays $22,631 to 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Deferred tax assets: 












































Depreciation = $22,631/5= $4,526. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax paid 
by the target is neglected. 
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Target I 
Scenario II: An acquirer pays $38,856 to acquire Target I in a non-taxable acquisition. 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Depreciation (10,000) (10,000) (10,000) (10,000) (10,000) 
Taxable income (5,000) (5,000) (5,000) (5,000) (5,000) 
Tax benefit 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 1,750 
Net cash flows 6,750 6,750 6,750 6,750 6,750 
Net present value to the acquirer: 25,588 
Amount paid to the target: 38,856 
Taxable gains to the target: 0 
Capital gains tax of the target: 0 
Net amount received by the target: 38,856 
Scenario 12: An acquirer pays $38,856 to acquire Target I in a taxable acquisition. 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 
Depreciation7 (7,771) (7,771) (7,771) (7,771) (7,771) 
Taxable income (2,771) (2,771) (2,771) (2,771) (2,771) 
Tax benefit 970 970 970 970 970 
Net cash flows 5,970 5,970 5,970 5,970 5,970 
Net present value to the acquirer: 22,631 
Amount paid to the target: 38,856 
Taxable gains to the target: (11,144) 
Capital gains tax of the target: (2,229) 
Net amount received by the target: 41,084 
Depreciation = $38,856/5 = $7,771. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax paid 
by the target is neglected. 
Scenario 13: An acquirer pays $22,631 to acquire Target I in a taxable acquisition. 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Net amount received by the target: 
Depreciation = $22,631/5 = $4,526. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax paid 





































4. Targets with Extremely Low BKMV Ratios 
Assume there are three potential target firms with basic financial information as follows. 
Market Book Value Tax Basis of Deferred Deferred 

















 Effects of deferred taxes are not included. 
2
 DTA and DTL are not included. 
For the following scenarios, assume discount rate = 10%, corporate income tax rate = 35%, and capital 
gains tax Rate = 20%. Target firms are predicted to have net pretax cash flows of $500,000 for the next five 
years and assume their residual values are zero. Assume target firms' assets are fully depreciated by the 
acquirers in five years with a straight-line method. 
Target J 
Scenario Jl: An acquirer pays $1,258,541 to acquire Target J in a non-taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 
Depreciation (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) (20,000) 
Taxable income 480,000 480,000 480,000 480,000 480,000 
Tax expense (168,000) (168,000) (168,000) (168,000) (168,000) 
Net tax payment (168,000) (168,000) (168,000) (168,000) (168,000) 
Net cash flows 332,000 332,000 332,000 332,000 332,000 
Net present value to the acquirer: 1,258,541 
Amount paid to the target: 1,258,541 
Taxable gains to the target: 0 
Capital gains tax of the target: 0 
Net amount received by the target: 1,258,541 
Scenario J2: An acquirer pays $1,258,541 to acquire Target J in a taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 




Net tax payment 




































Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Net amount received by the target: 
Depreciation = $1,258,541/5 = $251,708. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains 
tax paid by the target is neglected. 
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Scenario J3: An acquirer pays $1,565,966 to acquire 
Net pretax cash flows 
Depreciation2 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
















































 Depreciation = $1,258,541/5= $251,708. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax 
paid by the target is neglected. 
3
 Amortization of goodwill from acquisition = ($l,565,966-l,258,541)/5 = $61,485. 
Target K 
Scenario Kl: An acquirer pays $1,258,541 to acquire Target K in a non-taxable acquisition. 




Amortization of Deferred Tax Assets4 
Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 














































Deferred tax assets of $20,000 are amortized over the five years via a straight-line method. 
Scenario K2: An acquirer pays $1,258,541 to acquire Target K in a taxable acquisition. 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Deferred tax assets: 





































Depreciation = $1,258,541/5 = $251,708. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax paid by the target is 
neglected. 
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Scenario K3: An acquirer pays $1,565,966 to acquire Target K in a taxable acquisition. 
V o u r 1 V o a r 0 V«n»f 1 V ^ Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 
Depreciation6 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
Deferred tax assets: 











































 Depreciation = $1,258,541/5= $251,708. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains tax 
paid by the target is neglected. 
Target L 
quire Targe 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
i arger L, 
Scenario LI: An acquirer pays $1,245,273 to ac t L in a non-taxable acquisition. 
Ve-ar 1 pnr 9 Vsar % Ve>ar 4 
Net pretax cash flows 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 
Depreciation (10,000) (10,000) (10,000) (10,000) (10,000) 
Taxable income 490,000 490,000 490,000 490,000 490,000 
Tax expense (171,500) (171,500) (171,500) (171,500) (171,500) 
Net tax payment (171,500) (171,500) (171,500) (171,500) (171,500) 
Net cash flows 328,500 328,500 328,500 328,500 328,500 
Net present value to the acquirer: 1,245,273 
Amount paid to the target: 1,258,541 
Taxable gains to the target: 0 
Capital gains tax of the target: 0 
Net amount received by the target: 1,258,541 
Scenario L2: An acquirer pays $1,258,541 to acquire Target L in a taxable acquisition. 
Yearl Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
Net pretax cash flows 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 500,000 
Depreciation7 (251,708) (251,708) (251,708) (251,708) (251,708) 
Taxable income 248,292 248,292 248,292 248,292 248,292 
Tax expense (86,902) (86,902) (86,902) (86,902) (86,902) 
Net tax payment (86,902) (86,902) (86,902) (86,902) (86,902) 
Net cash flows 413,098 413,098 413,098 413,098 413,098 
Net present value to the acquirer: 1,565,966 
Amount paid to the target: 1,258,541 
Taxable gains to the target: 241,708 
Capital gains tax of the target: 0 
Net amount received by the target: 1,016,833 
Depreciation = $1,258,541/5 = $251,708. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains 
tax paid by the target is neglected. 
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Scenario L3: An acquirer pays $1,565,966 to acquire 
Net pretax cash flows 
Depreciation8 




Net tax payment 
Net cash flows 
Net present value to the acquirer: 
Amount paid to the target: 
Taxable gains to the target: 
Capital gains tax of the target: 
















































Depreciation = $1,258,541/5 = $251,708. The acquirers' additional step-up basis from the capital gains 
tax paid by the target is neglected. 
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